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I. INTRODUCTION: BEYOND REASON
since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you;
. . .
and kisses are a better fate 
than wisdom.1 
Christopher Columbus Langdell paid attention to the syntax of things. 
Law, he insisted, was a science whose principles or doctrines can be
mastered only by studying appellate court cases.2  To subject law’s 
decisionmaking process to scientific inquiry,3 Langdell introduced the 
case method, focusing the attention of law students on the specific issues 
presented in appellate court cases and the intellectual analysis of the 
judges leading to the resolution of those issues.4  Law professors using 
the case method do not lecture; rather, they employ Socratic dialogue to
probe their students’ analysis of the issues in the cases being studied. 
 1. e.e. cummings, since feeling is first, in IS 5 (1926), reprinted in E.E. CUMMINGS,
COMPLETE POEMS 1904–1962, at 291 (George J. Firmage ed., 1994).  Consider also these
lyrics from a song by Bob Dylan: “I stood unwound beneath the skies/And clouds
unbound by laws.”  BOB DYLAN, Lay Down Your Weary Tune, on BIOGRAPH (Colombia 
Records 1985). 
2. In the preface to his contracts casebook, Langdell wrote: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.  To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law. . . .  [T]he shortest and best, if not the only way of 
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied. 
C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (1871). 
3. Anthony Kronman suggested that Langdell’s conception of law as a science 
was inspired by a geometrical model of the scientific method.  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 171 (1993). 
4. To Langdell, legal education was a science to be taught at a university, not a 
craft to be learned at a lawyer’s side.  Through use of the case method, Langdell was 
able to shift the training of lawyers from law offices as apprentices to the university
classroom as students. See John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes,
and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 160 (1993).  The
elementary principles of contracts, torts, or other areas of law are discovered by surveying the
case law in that subject.  “Once they have been identified, it is then the task of scholars
to work out, in an analytically rigorous manner, the subordinate principles entailed by
them.”  KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 171. 
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Through a rigorous analysis of those issues, law students are educated to
“think like lawyers.”5 
The case method with Socratic dialogue continues today as the 
“signature pedagogy” of legal education.6  However, in its singular quest 
to sharpen the ability of law students to engage in analytic reasoning, 
this method trivializes and even suppresses students’ values and emotions 
and the role they play in conflict resolution.7  Such matters are not considered
5. Although the terms “to think like a lawyer” or “to think like lawyers” are 
commonly used, correct English grammar calls for the substitution of “as” for “like.”  A
well-educated law student thinks as a lawyer thinks. 
6. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 23–24 
(2007). “[T]he deep structure of the pedagogy is that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is about 
processes of analytic reasoning and the grasp of legal ‘doctrine’ and principles rather 
than learning a system of statutory or ‘black letter’ law.”  Id. at 24.  A survey of law schools 
revealed that the Socratic dialogue is the predominant teaching methodology used in law 
school classes. Socratic dialogue is used in 97% of first-year courses, 93% of upper-
class courses, and even 67% of seminars.  Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey
of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996). 
7. See, e.g., Lila A. Coleburn & Julia C. Spring, Socrates Unbound: 
Developmental Perspectives on the Law School Experience, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 5,
26 (2000) (asserting that law professors teach “students how to substitute reason and
rigorous analysis for emotion and lay ways of looking at things”).  “The only passion 
valued in this classroom is that for reason and the right answer.” Id.; Angela P. Harris &
Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal 
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1773 (1993) (“[T]he phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
means suppressing or denying one’s feelings and personal experience while putting forth 
a ‘cold’ analysis of the ‘facts.’”); Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and
Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 78–79 (2002) (asserting 
that conventional legal education “teaches that tough-minded analysis, hard facts, and
cold logic are the tools of a good lawyer, and it has little room for emotion, imagination,
and morality”); Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an
Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006) (“A core presumption underlying
modern legality is that reason and emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to 
separate spheres of human existence; the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant
policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not belong.”); 
Michael Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 624, 628 (1983) (“Many
lawyers and law teachers are committed to getting the job done, to performing, to dealing 
with behavior divorced from feelings about that behavior, to narrowly conceiving legal 
problems, to not playing head shrinker, to avoiding what might be labeled ‘touchy-
feely,’ to objectifying and to not subjectifying legal work.”); Marjorie A. Silver,
Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1173, 1181 
(1999) (asserting that “the emphasis on rational, analytical discourse and the Socratic method
in law school . . . contribute[s] to the devaluation and denial of emotional processes and
influences”); Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological 
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 124 (1968) (“[T]he Socratic Method
exaggerates, and in a sense, distorts the importance of intellect. . . . [W]hen the Socratic 
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worthy of class discussion.  Students are taught “to think like lawyers,” 
but they are not taught to “feel like lawyers.”8  Dean Roger Cramton
asserted that in order to ensure that students develop “a ‘tough-minded’
and analytical attitude toward lawyer tasks and professional roles,” the 
ordinary religion of the law school classroom requires the law professor
to “stress cognitive rationality along with ‘hard’ facts and ‘cold’ logic
and ‘concrete’ realities.  Emotion, imagination, sentiments of affection and
trust, a sense of wonder or awe at the inexplicable—these soft and mushy 
domains of the ‘tender minded’ are off limits for law students.”9  As  
Professor Kingsfield informed his class, “You come in here with a skull
full of mush, and you leave thinking like a lawyer.”10  Students are 
denied the opportunity to develop as well-rounded human beings with
high ethical values and with the interpersonal skills necessary to 
understand11 and respond appropriately to their clients’ concerns.12  When 
values and emotional issues are ignored, students are depersonalized13 
and their level of distress rises.14 
Method leads to an ablation of emotional awareness, it can have a seriously distorting
effect. . . . The Socratic Method reinforces the false image that it is possible to get rid of 
emotion, and the nature of the Socratic arena in some law schools makes it sound
possible to achieve this impossible goal.”). 
8. I do not agree with those who assert that teaching students to feel like lawyers
means teaching that it is right to be controlling, cool, dispassionate, unfeeling, and 
arrogant. See Meltsner, supra note 7, at 624 (attributing the assertion to David Kaplow).
Rather, feeling like lawyers requires that they consider the emotional and social consequences
of decisions. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1381 (1997). 
9. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 250 (1978). The 2007 Carnegie Report proclaimed: “In their all-
consuming first year, students are told to set aside their desire for justice.  They are
warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people in the cases they
discuss cloud their legal analyses.”  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 187. 
10. A statement spoken by John Houseman, an actor, portraying Professor Charles
W. Kingsfield, Jr., in the motion picture adaptation of JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER
CHASE (Whitston Publ’g Co. 2003) (1971). 
11. For example, in discussing the Equal Protection Clause, should students
consider the perspective of an African American person on a segregated bus in the South 
in the 1950s? He or she was permitted to ride on the bus and to arrive at his or her 
destination at the same time as a white person, and the fare for both passengers was 
equal.  But is the African American person denied equal protection if he or she was 
compelled to ride only in the back of the bus? Ask Rosa Parks for her opinion. For an 
explanation as to why the Author chooses not to hyphenate African American(s), see
Grant H. Morris, Greatest Legal Movie of All Time: Proclaiming the Real Winner 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 739 n.21 (2010). 
12. See Watson, supra note 7, at 117. 
13. See Hess, supra note 7, at 79 (“For some students, ‘learning to think like a 
lawyer’ means abandoning their ideals, ethical values, and sense of self.”); Lawrence S. 
Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical 
Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 117 (2002) 
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But emotion will not be stifled.  Susan Bandes began her landmark
book on the relationship of emotion to law by declaring: “Emotion pervades 
the law.”15  Indeed, as Laura Little aptly asserted: “Emotions are so key 
to the richness of life that no effort to understand humans and human
society could make any claim to accuracy or completeness without taking
them into account.”16  Even though there is no unequivocal agreement on
how “emotion” should be defined or its exact relationship to cognition,17 
insights from psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and neurobiology
indicate that emotion acts in concert with cognition to shape perceptions 
and reactions.18  More than forty years ago, psychiatrist Andrew Watson 
proclaimed: “Emotions are part and parcel of the biological reactivity of 
the human animal and are therefore irremovable.  While they may be 
modified and grotesquely distorted, they are always present to influence
all human behavior . . . .”19 Lila Coleburn, a clinical psychologist, and her
co-author, Julia Spring, the Director of Student Counseling at Columbia 
Law School, wrote: 
Because of the very complexity of human perception, emotion is needed to 
assist in sorting through information and exercising judgment about life 
situations, legal and other.  Reason and emotion are melded in human cognition;
our reasoning strategies are bound up with our feelings, for better or worse. 
Although feelings can impair the quality of reasoning, their lack is also an
(“Thinking ‘like a lawyer’ is fundamentally negative; it is critical, pessimistic, and
depersonalizing.”). 
14. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
225, 225. 
15. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 1 (Susan A. Bandes 
ed., 1999).
16. Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 974, 975 (2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 15). 
17. Id. at 981. For an in-depth discussion of the debates about the taxonomy and
definition of emotion, see id. at 981–86; for an in-depth discussion of the debates about 
the relationship between cognition and emotion, see id. at 987–92.  Susan Bandes 
acknowledged: “Emotion theorists have never come close to agreeing on a definition of
emotion; indeed, there seems to be widespread agreement on the impossibility of finding
one.” Bandes supra note 15, at 10. Nevertheless, Professor Bandes asserted that a 
discussion of emotion’s relationship to law “can proceed despite the lack of definition.”
Id.
 18. Bandes, supra note 15, at 7. 
19. Watson, supra note 7, at 124. 
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impairment, and nothing resembling so-called pure reason is met in human life
except in cases of serious pathology.20 
Over the last half century, an extensive “law and emotion” literature 
has emerged.21  Early researchers focused on the deleterious effects of 
legal education on law students—especially on first-year law students. 
In 1986, a large empirical study published in the American Bar
Foundation Research Journal reported that 17%–40% of the 320 
students and alumni studied “suffered significant levels of depression”22 
and that 20%–40% “reported other significantly elevated symptoms, 
including obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, anxiety, hostility, 
paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (social alienation and isolation).”23 
Andrew Benjamin and his colleagues found that before entering law 
school, these individuals tested within the normal range for such symptoms, 
but that within a few months after law school began, first-year law 
students were experiencing severe psychological disturbances—they scored
two standard deviations above normal expectation.24 
Legal educators did not respond to this proof of their students’ distress. 
In a longitudinal study of law students published in the Journal of Legal 
Education in 2002, Kennon Sheldon and Lawrence Krieger confirmed 
20. Coleburn & Spring, supra note 7, at 23 (footnote omitted).  See also James B. 
Levy, As a Last Resort, Ask the Students: What They Say Makes Someone an Effective 
Law Teacher, 58 ME. L. REV. 49, 57 (2006) (“[E]motion is such an integral part of our
brain’s cognitive functioning that we literally would be unable to learn or solve problems
if not for its role in assigning meaning and a context to every experience.”); Meltsner, 
supra note 7, at 633 (“While only an extreme anti-intellectual would disregard the 
importance of objective thought, rational deduction, and empirical proof to the practice 
of law, a method of training lawyers which ignores the intuitive, the emotive, and the 
personal belongs not to the history of science but to the history of pseudoscience.”).
21. In an article that attempts to classify “law and emotion” scholarship, the author 
lists 205 references, consisting of 195 books, articles, and symposia, plus 10 court cases, 
on law and emotion topics that were published between 1930 and 2006. Only 30 of
those 205 references, consisting of 26 books, articles, and symposia and 4 court cases, 
were published prior to 1980.  Maroney, supra note 7, at 136–42. 
22. Benjamin et al., supra note 14, at 236. 
23. Id.
24. Id. at 240. After only six months of law school, many students were reported 
to be suffering extreme stress.  They were concerned about their ability to meet the 
perceived high standards of law school, and they experienced feelings of inadequacy and
inferiority. Id. at 244. First-year students were overwhelmed. Id. at 247.  See also 
Matthew M. Dammeyer & Narina Nunez, Anxiety and Depression Among Law Students:
Current Knowledge and Future Directions, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 63 (1999)
(reporting that in that some studies, anxiety measured in law students “is comparable to
psychiatric populations”).  Law students also reported suffering depression at a higher 
rate than experienced by the general population and by comparison groups, such as 
medical students. Id. at 67. 
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the conclusions of the Benjamin study.25  Although students entered law
school as normal, healthy human beings, “[w]ithin six months, [they]
experienced marked decreases in well-being and life satisfaction and
marked increases in depression, negative affect, and physical symptoms.”26 
In the sixteen years since the startling results of the Benjamin study were 
published, nothing had changed.27 
The nearly exclusive use of the case method in the first year contributes 
significantly to student anxiety.  The individual cases fail to provide
students with a theoretical framework to serve as a needed context for
their understanding of the area of law under consideration.28  Does the
particular case under discussion stand for a generally accepted proposition, 
or for some possible future trend, or even as an exception to the general
rule?  Without such a framework, students—especially first-year students— 
are confused. 
Additionally, most first-year courses are taught to classes of 75, or 
100, or more students by a professor who employs a Socratic dialogue. 
Thus, before a large group of colleagues, a student is forced to respond 
to a professor’s interrogation.  When each attempted answer elicits another 
question from the professor who never seems satisfied with any response,29 
the student being questioned becomes anxious,30 embarrassed,31 
25. Krieger, supra note 13, at 122.  Although Lawrence Krieger is the sole author
of this article, the research project was conducted by Kennon Sheldon and Lawrence 
Krieger. Id.  For a more complete discussion of the research, see Kennon M. Sheldon &
Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students?
Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261
(2004).
26. Krieger, supra note 13, at 122. 
27. See Grant H. Morris, Preparing Law Students for Disappointing Exam Results:
Lessons from Casey at the Bat, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 441, 444 nn.16–18 (2008) (listing
law review articles written by psychiatrists, law professors, and law students attesting to 
the stress and anxiety experienced by students in the process of receiving a legal 
education).
28. See Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 91, 93 (2001) (asserting that in the absence of such framework, cases cannot be
fully understood and appreciated and are “largely incomprehensible” to students).
29. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 7, at 123 (“Since most professorial responses are 
questions, they are perceived as never-ending demands, and hoped-for relief never comes into
sight.”).
30. See, e.g., id. at 121 (specifically mentioning anxiety as a student response to a 
law professor’s use of Socratic dialogue). 
31. Michael J. Patton, The Student, the Situation, and Performance During the 
First Year of Law School, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10, 37 (1968) (specifically mentioning 
embarrassment as a student response to a law professor’s use of Socratic dialogue).
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vulnerable,32 intimidated,33 even terrified.34 As Duncan Kennedy, then a
law student at Yale, aptly asserted: “[T]here is a point at which no amount
of intellectual interest will overcome your fear and revulsion at the 
spectacle of the professor smiling quietly to himself as he prepares to lay 
your guts out on the floor yet once again, paternally.”35  Even well-
intentioned professors, employing a “kinder and gentler”36 Socratic
version, may be perceived—or misperceived—by students as sadistic37 
enemies,38 trying to destroy them. 
32. Watson, supra note 7, at 121 (specifically mentioning a “sense of helpless 
vulnerability” as a student response to a law professor’s use of Socratic dialogue).  See 
also Michael E. Carney, Narcissistic Concerns in the Educational Experience of Law
Students, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 17 (1990) (“Through [the] emphasis on a rigorous 
questioning attitude, law school education can threaten the personal values by which 
many students define themselves as distinct and special.”).
33. Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 641 
(1973) (specifically mentioning a feeling of intimidation as a student response to a law
professor’s use of Socratic dialogue).  See Watson, supra note 28, at 91 (“Some teachers
deliberately set out to intimidate students.”). 
34. See ALAN WATSON, THE SHAME OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 88 (2006)
(“[F]irst-year law school is education by terror . . . .”); Watson, supra note 28, at 91 
(reporting that students assert that first-year legal education is terrifying).  Duncan 
Kennedy, writing as a law student, asserted that the terror experienced by first-year law 
students is “a particular kind of terror: that of a person who knows himself defenseless 
before a person who has a demonstrated desire to hurt him. . . . The fear is the fear of the
victim.” Duncan Kennedy, Comment, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, YALE 
REV. L. & SOC. ACTION, Spring 1970, at 71, 75. See also OSBORN, supra note 10, 
(“When Hart, seat 259, heard his name, he froze.  Caught unprepared, he simply stopped 
functioning.  Then he felt his heart beat faster than he could ever remember its beating 
and his palms and arms break out in sweat.”); SCOTT TURROW, ONE L 298 (1977)
(describing legal education as “a schooling characterized by terror and the suppression of 
feeling”).
35. Kennedy, supra note 34, at 80. 
36. The influx of significant numbers of women into the law student body has 
been credited with the “softening” of the Socratic dialogue in law classes.  While men 
are considered to be rights-oriented thinkers, women are considered to be care-oriented 
thinkers.  A rigid adherence to “hard” Socratic interrogation and a complete failure to 
consider the perspective of female law students could be considered discriminatory.  See,
e.g., Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 193, 234–38 (1991).  Susan Bandes credits feminist jurisprudence “for many of
law’s early forays into emotion theory.”  Susan Bandes, What’s Love Got To Do with It?, 
8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 97, 98 (2001). Despite the “softening” of the Socratic 
dialogue in modern law school classes, the absence of periodic feedback on student
classroom performance and the use of one final examination to measure student course 
performance remain today as major sources of student psychological stress.  See, e.g.,
Morris, supra note 27, at 448–53.  Barbara Glesner Fines notes that although “the days
of . . . professorial hazing . . . are rapidly receding,” nevertheless, “an educational philosophy
grounded in a competitive ethos” remains.  Barbara Glesner Fines, Fundamental Principles
and Challenges of Humanizing Legal Education, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 313, 315, 316 (2008).
37. See Kennedy, supra note 34, at 74 (acknowledging that not all law professors
are unrestrained sadists, but asserting “there must be something deeply corrupting about 
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Because emotion plays a vital role in the learning process, one would 
assume that legal scholars would not only decry the impact of negative 
emotional experiences suffered by law students in their classes, but they
would also consider the potential benefit of positive emotional experiences 
on law students in those same classes.  But that possibility is largely 
ignored. Rather, authors of more recent law and emotion literature typically 
write about a specific emotion, such as disgust, shame, or fear, and whether 
law should take that emotion into account,39 or they analyze a legal doctrine
or legal determination, such as victim impact statements or capital
sentencing, and consider how the law uses or should use emotion in its
decision,40 or they focus on legal actors, such as jurors, judges, or lawyers
and how emotions affect their decisionmaking.41 
Some writers have advocated that clinical course offerings be expanded
so that students can develop the emotional skills necessary for them to
become competent in affective and interpersonal matters that they will
confront as practicing attorneys.42  Others have suggested that professional 
the daily exercise of a license to inflict pain”); Watson, supra note 7, at 109 (“I will not
go so far as to use the word sadistic to describe [the feeling experienced by professors
teaching first-year classes], but there can be no doubt that they are enjoying their work.
They view their task as nearly a holy mission to root out all ill-conceived and unreasoned 
attitudes in their students.”).
38. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 7, at 123 (asserting that “the Socratic teacher, . . . 
in the eyes of the student, tends to turn into an enemy”).
39. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 125–26 (citing authorities). 
40. Id. at 129–30 (citing authorities); see also Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes 
and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the Death Penalty, 33 VT. L. REV. 489, 511–18
(2009); Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2009, at 1, 9–25; Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging 
Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355 (2008), http://colloquy.law.northwestern. 
edu/main/2008/06/engaging-capita.html. 
41. Maroney, supra note 7, at 131–33 (citing authorities); see also Todd E. Pettys, 
The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609 (2007).  For a proposed taxonomy for
all law and emotion scholarship, see generally Maroney, supra note 7, at 125–33. 
42. Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social
Psychology Teach Us About Teaching Law Students To Make Ethical, Professionally 
Responsible, Choices, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643, 694 (2004) (“Clinics, in which the 
students represent clients in real matters under the close supervision of experienced 
lawyers/teachers, thus provide a quintessential locale for emotional engagement of law 
students in factually complex matters, challenging them to identify and grapple with
issues of professional responsibility.”); John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional 
Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law 
Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 350 (2008) (suggesting that instruction on emotional 
intelligence “can be incorporated into substantive courses that have a skills component or
into skills courses [such as Negotiation], which are a better fit”); Deborah L. Rhode, 
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responsibility should be taught pervasively throughout the curriculum so
that students are provided with frequent opportunities to express their 
“emotional attitudes toward the ideals, tasks, goals, and problems of the
legal profession.”43  In its 2007 monograph, Educating Lawyers, the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching proposed that legal
education focused on practical skills and professional identity be elevated to
the same level as education for legal analysis.44 By doing so, a holistic 
educational experience is created, integrating the cognitive, the practical,
and the ethical-social elements of legal education.45 
I also believe that emotional issues confronting lawyers in “real”
practice should not be deferred until students’ second or third year
of law school. Those issues are an essential part of practical skills and
professional identity development.  In the typical first-year lawyering 
skills course, students learn how to perform legal research and write a 
memorandum of law in their first semester.  In their second semester,
they write an appellate brief and make an appellate moot court argument.  
Such a narrow focus does not adequately introduce students to emotional 
issues they are likely to encounter in dealing with clients, witnesses,
jurors, judges, other attorneys—and themselves—in the practice of law.
Nevertheless, without restructuring an already crowded lawyering skills 
Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547,
1563 (1993) (urging law schools to commit “to more cooperative, collaborative, and empathetic 
lawyering” that would be achieved through “much greater emphasis [on] legal clinics,
simulations, pro bono programs, and other settings for interactive, experiential learning”); 
Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What To Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REV. 609, 662–63 (2007) (bemoaning the fact that skills training and clinical 
education “are not integrated with the lecture classes, and they have been marginalized
by their later introduction into the curriculum and by the norms of the professoriate”); 
Silver, supra note 7, at 1174 (suggesting that skills courses, such as counseling, 
negotiation, and drafting, provide an opportunity to prepare students for the emotional 
dimensions of lawyering). 
43. Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional 
Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 20 (1963); see also Joshua E. Perry, Thinking Like
a Professional, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 159, 164 (“[A] legal pedagogy focused on a hard
‘think like a lawyer’ mentality unleavened by a mushy ‘think like a professional’ 
sensibility threatens to produce legal professionals incapable of balancing the complex 
demands of personal well-being and professional service.”). 
44. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 12–15. 
45. Id. at 191.  See James R. Maxeiner, Educating Lawyers Now and Then: Two
Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1
(2007) (comparing the 2007 Carnegie Foundation Report to the 1914 Carnegie 
Foundation Report prepared by Josef Redlich). Another report on legal education, also
published in 2007, recommended: “Law schools should organize their curriculums to 
develop knowledge, skills, and values progressively; integrate the teaching of theory,
doctrine, and practice; and teach professionalism pervasively throughout all three years 
of law school.” ROY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 8–9 (2007). 
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course, first-year law students can be introduced to these issues if professors
teaching substantive first-year courses devote at least some time to them
in their courses.
Unfortunately, most legal educators have not fully appreciated “the 
insight offered by cognitive science that emotion plays a vital, critical
role in normal adaptive reasoning.”46  But even authors who urge professors
to alter their teaching styles and to integrate emotional issues into class
discussion do not provide examples for professors to emulate.  Some write 
in generalities. A professor, we are informed, can show students “the 
complex interplay of emotion, logic and aspiration in legal analysis and 
lawyering.  He [or she] can lead them through the struggle to assimilate
complexity and respond creatively, the hallmarks of adaptive intelligence 
which he [or she] has cultivated over time.”47  Other authors urge professors
to analyze emotions, asserting, “[O]ur view of reason and emotion as 
complementary elements of thought requires us not just to allow emotions
into the classroom, but to learn how to examine them, learn from them,
and incorporate them into rational argument.”48 
Educating law students about emotions should begin in the first year 
of legal education.49  However, I question whether it is necessary, or 
even advisable, to engage in an intellectual analysis of emotional issues 
in first-year law classes.  Rather, I want students to actually experience
emotion in the classroom setting as they discuss various fact situations 
and the legal principles involved in the resolution of disputes involving
those facts. After all, fact situations, even when studied in the context of 
appellate court decisions, are created by people.  Those people are judged
by other people—judges and juries.  Law students need to understand
46. Coleburn & Spring, supra note 7, at 23.  Coleburn and Spring added: “Moreover,
without the development of emotional skills such as empathy, reflectiveness, and tolerance of
disappointment, which allow the grey area thinking needed to appreciate complexity, 
conflict resolution is impossible, and ‘knowledge is built on sand.’” Id. at 23–24. 
47. Id. at 37; see also Rhonda V. Magee, Legal Education and the Formation of 
Professional Identity: A Critical Spirituo-Humanistic—“Humanity Consciousness”— 
Perspective, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 467, 476 (2007) (“We should talk about 
the spiritual and emotional implications of what we study, what we do, and how we 
interact with one another, so as to encourage and to model an approach to legal education 
and practice that brings the whole person into the room.”). 
48. Harris & Shultz, supra note 7, at 1787. 
49. See Lerner, supra note 42, at 704 (“What we omit, as what we include in the 
first year curriculum, sends an implicit, but readily learned, message about what we 
think—no, what we ‘know’—is important for lawyers to do, and therefore for law 
students to learn.”). 
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and appreciate the emotions of people, including their own emotions, if 
they are to become the best lawyers they are capable of becoming.  In
the next Part of this Article, I present specific examples from my first-
year Torts course in which I raise issues in a manner that results in an
emotional response by students.  I demonstrate how such methodology 
stimulates class discussion, increases student interest, and enriches the
educational experience. I hope that by providing such examples, I will 
be able to convince other professors to modify their courses so that their
students will not only learn more, but they will also be more satisfied by 
the instruction they receive. 
II. EXPERIENCING EMOTION: EXAMPLES FROM A TORTS CLASS
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”50 
A. The First Question 
As a part of the orientation program for first-year law students at my
law school, a simulated class session is conducted in each section, taught 
by a professor who teaches a course to those students. The session is 
entitled: “Demystifying the Socratic Method.”  I always volunteer to
teach that class.51  For this special session, I assign three torts cases to 
the students. Students are informed that the class will be conducted as a 
regular class session in Torts and that they are expected to be fully 
prepared on the assignment for this class. 
To begin the class, I call upon a student—let us assume her name is 
Courtney—and inform her that I feel confident that she, as a first-year
law student experiencing her first real law school class, is fully prepared
on the assignment for the day.  Therefore, I am giving her the privilege, 
the distinct honor, of answering the first substantive question that will be 
asked in law school of anyone in her class.  I pause for a moment for the 
enormity of the event to sink in, and then I ask: “What is the difference 
between a jeweler and a jailor?” I then add: “I know this is a difficult 
question, in fact, it’s a real conundrum, but do the best you can.”
Typically, the responding student will tell me that a jeweler makes or 
sells jewelry and that a jailor runs a jail or keeps prisoners locked up.  I 
respond by saying, “That’s not bad for a first answer.  If this was a 
50. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  Consider also this well-known 
saying: “Experience is the best teacher.”
51. In schools that do not offer such an opportunity as a part of the orientation
program, a professor can teach his or her first class session using the methodology that I 
use in the orientation class session.
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question on your final examination, I would probably award you a grade 
of D+, or maybe even a C– if I was feeling generous.  However, if you 
want to know the ‘right’ answer—the answer that would earn you a 
grade of A or A+, I’ll tell you.  A jeweler sells watches; a jailor watches 
cells.
“I know that you are all asking yourselves: what is the relevance of 
this question; what is its significance to our study of law?  And I will tell 
you. Before the jeweler sells those watches, he must either own them or
have been authorized by the owner to sell them.  That’s the law of 
personal property that you study in your Property course.  And if he sells 
those watches, that’s a contract for the sale of goods—offer, acceptance, 
consideration—which you study in your Contracts course.  But if the 
prisoner who the jailor is watching is in his cell because he stole those 
watches before they were sold, that’s the crime of larceny, which you 
study in your Criminal Law course.  However, before the thief can be 
convicted of a crime, he must undergo a criminal trial in which he is 
accorded certain rights—the right to a trial by a jury of his peers, the
right to be represented by an attorney, the privilege against self-
incrimination—which you will study in your Constitutional Law course. 
And if the rightful owner of those watches sues the thief to reobtain that 
property or to be paid for the damage done to those watches, that is the 
tort of conversion—the thief wrongfully converted the property to his 
own use—which you will study in your Torts course.  And in a civil 
trial, in which the rules of civil procedure will be applied, the thief will 
be found liable for the tort.  You will study those rules in your Civil 
Procedure course. 
“Just think. If only Courtney had been able to answer this question 
correctly, we would have completed all of the courses in the first year of 
law school, and we could have moved on today to the second year.  I 
could have saved each of you over $40,000 in tuition and a full year of 
law studies.  Unfortunately, however, Courtney did not give me the 
correct answer.  So I guess we’ll just have to spend a whole year on 
those courses. 
“I know what you are thinking.  Professor Morris’s first question 
surprised us, his answer to that question was clever, and his explanation 
of the significance of the answer to the study of law was extremely
insightful. We are so fortunate to have such a brilliant professor to teach
us Torts! But we have a question that still lingers in our minds.
Obviously, Professor Morris’s excellent answer deserved a grade of A+.
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However, as the kind, caring, compassionate people we are, we are
concerned about our colleague, Courtney.  Was Professor Morris too 
harsh in grading Courtney’s answer a D+ or even a C–?  After all, there
was nothing in the assignment that we read that would prepare us for 
that question.  Courtney’s answer was as good an answer as any of us 
would have been able to give. Shouldn’t she at least receive a grade of
B or B+? 
“Well, I’ll tell you why I didn’t give Courtney a higher grade on her 
answer. Courtney did not take advantage of the clue I gave her—the 
hint that would enable her to give a better response to my question.  Do 
you remember what I said after I asked Courtney the first question?”  I
usually wait for a response but seldom receive one. “I informed Courtney, 
and the rest of you, that the question I was asking was a difficult question,
in fact, it was a real conundrum.  What is a conundrum?” I then take the 
dictionary that I brought to class and hand it to a student sitting directly 
in front of me.  I ask the student to look up the definition of conundrum 
and read it to the class. The student does so and reports: “conundrum: a 
riddle whose answer contains a pun (Ex.: ‘What’s the difference between a
jeweler and a jailer?’  ‘One sells watches and the other watches cells.’).”52 
I then say: “So you see, I didn’t just make up that question.  You never 
know where you will find your source of law!  Let me summarize all 
you have accomplished in your first five minutes of law school: You
have learned the difference between a jeweler and a jailor.  You have 
learned the significance of that difference to the study of law.  You have
learned that in this class we work together to support our colleagues. 
You have learned that although I may be a tough grader on examination
questions, nevertheless, I try to be fair and to have some supportable 
basis for the grades that I award.  You have learned the importance of words
to law and to lawyers—even a word such as conundrum. Words are our
tools, our only tools, in talking to clients, in drafting legal documents, in
making arguments to a judge or jury.  When you read the cases in your
coursebook, you should closely examine the words used by the judge
who wrote the opinion you are reading.  Those words inform you of the 
judge’s reasons for the decision that he or she made.  And finally, you 
learned that to demystify the Socratic method, you must first mystify it.
You learned all that in just five minutes in this class.  Isn’t law school 
wonderful?”
52. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 310 
(David B. Guralnik ed., 2d college ed. 1970). 
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What emotions did my students experience in their first five minutes 
of class?  When class first began, the students were excited to have their
first class, but they were also a bit nervous, apprehensive about the 
questions I would ask and their ability to answer them.  When I asked 
my first question, the students were surprised—the question had nothing 
to do with the material that had been assigned.  Was I merely joking, or
did I really want that question answered?  When I awarded Courtney’s 
answer a grade of D+ or C–, they were fretful, concerned about my
announcement of a grading standard that would make it impossible for 
them to succeed.  When I gave my answer to that first question, they 
laughed—although some may have groaned.  When I explained the 
significance of my answer, they were intrigued that I could fit all of the 
first-year courses into that one answer. When I explained that Courtney 
did not use the clue I provided to her, they were incredulous—they had
no idea that my clue was the use of the word conundrum. When the 
student read the dictionary definition of conundrum, the students were
surprised to learn that my question had come from an example of a
conundrum contained in the dictionary that I had provided.
I believe that humor, if appropriately timed and in appropriate doses,
is an effective tool to lessen anxiety and relieve tension that students 
experience as they commence their legal education.53  Having achieved
that goal in the first five minutes of class, my students were now
emotionally ready to begin analyzing the cases that had been assigned
for class discussion. 
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
When we study the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
we begin with a discussion of State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v.
Siliznoff.54 In that case, Siliznoff was pressured to sign a note agreeing 
to pay the Association for the privilege of collecting rubbish from a 
customer who had previously been serviced by a member of the
53. See Hess, supra note 7, at 105 (suggesting that humor by a professor enhances 
the classroom experience, provided that the humor is not at the expense of a student); Levy, 
supra note 20, at 82 (asserting that students appreciate humor by their professor to make the
class entertaining).
54. 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952).  I use the Prosser casebook for my Torts class, and 
therefore, cases discussed in this Article are found in that casebook. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ
ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS (11th ed. 2005). 
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Association.  If he did not agree to sign and pay the note, he was told that 
he would be beaten up and forced out of business.55 The Association’s
conduct did not constitute the tort of assault because it threatened only
future harm and did not place Siliznoff in apprehension of imminent 
harmful bodily contact.  Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court 
ruled that by making a serious threat to Siliznoff’s physical well-being, 
the Association’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to constitute the 
recently created tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.56 
Students then read the case of Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, 
Inc.57  In Slocum, the plaintiff, a customer in a food store, sued for the 
mental suffering and ensuing heart attack she allegedly had suffered,
caused by insulting language directed toward her by the defendant’s 
store clerk. Specifically, in reply to the plaintiff’s inquiry as to the price
of an item he was marking, the clerk replied: “If you want to know the 
price, you’ll have to find out the best way you can.  You stink to me.”58 
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action,59 and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.60  The case stands for 
the proposition that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
requires an intent on the part of the defendant to inflict severe emotional 
distress. Thus, insulting language, which is intended to inflict only mere
emotional distress, is not actionable.61 
I typically ask the class whether they agree with the decision that 
seeks to place a reasonable limit on liability for this tort.  The students 
invariably agree with the decision.  After all, it is early in the semester 
and they have the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court as their authority. 
I then ask, “How did the court characterize the defendant’s conduct, his 
insult, in this case?”  I point them to specific language in the court’s opinion 
in which the court declares that the defendant’s insult was “innocuous.”62  I 
then ask them for the definition of innocuous. Webster’s defines innocuous
as “harmless.”63  I then ask, “But didn’t the plaintiff allege that as a result of
the insult, she suffered a heart attack?  Is conduct that causes a heart 
55. State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n, 240 P.2d at 284. 
56. Id. at 285. 
57. 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958). 
58. Id. at 396–97. 
59. Id. at 396. 
60. Id. at 398. 
61. Id. at 397. 
62. Id. at 398. 
63. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, supra
note 52, at 726 (defining innocuous as “that does not injure or harm; harmless”).  Yes, I
bring my dictionary to class in the event that the student who is called upon misdefines 
the word.
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attack harmless conduct?”  They are stunned. I then ask: “Do you 
think the court just didn’t believe the plaintiff’s claim that she
suffered a heart attack from the insult she received?” They readily
agree. I then respond: “Well, let me tell you. I went back and researched
this case very carefully.  And I want you to know, Mrs. Slocum—Mrs.
Julia Slocum—did suffer a heart attack that was caused by the 
defendant’s insult.  I know this to be true.  The court knew this to be true. 
And you know this to be true!” 
“How do you know this?” I ask. If they are unable to come up with
the answer, I ask them to consider the procedural posture of the case.
The court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.  In essence, the court did 
not give the plaintiff an opportunity to present evidence to prove her
claim because even if she was able to establish the facts as she alleged
them to be, the applicable law would not support recovery by her.  To
make such a ruling—to deprive the plaintiff the opportunity to offer
evidence in support of her claim—the court must assume that the 
plaintiff would be able to prove the facts that she alleged.  Here, to throw 
the plaintiff out of court without giving her the opportunity to offer 
evidence, the court must assume that she suffered a heart attack caused 
by the defendant’s insult. 
“How is it possible to say that conduct that causes a heart attack is
innocuous conduct?” I ask. Usually the students are too flabbergasted 
to answer the question. If they do not, I suggest: “How about the 
argument that the defendant only intended to insult Mrs. Slocum, but he 
did not intend to cause her to suffer a heart attack?  Does that make his 
conduct innocuous and not subject to tort liability?”  After a brief 
discussion of this possibility, I ask: “Assume a practical joker pulls a 
chair out from under the plaintiff intending for the plaintiff to fall to the 
floor without suffering any injury other than the offensive contact with 
the floor. But suppose the plaintiff suffers an injury to his or her spine 
or a broken leg.  Can the defendant avoid liability for the tort of battery
by establishing that he intended only offensive contact but not harmful 
contact?” Having recently studied the tort of battery, the students know
that liability will be imposed.  I then inform them that unlike any other 
intentional tort that we have studied, or that we will study, a defendant 
who is charged with the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress will be able to avoid liability by establishing that he only
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intended to cause a small injury—mere emotional distress—instead of a
big injury—severe emotional distress. 
“But perhaps,” I suggest, “there is another argument that can be made 
to support the court’s decision to nonsuit the plaintiff.”  I then ask: “Why
do you suppose the store clerk insulted the customer; why did he say:
‘You stink to me.’?” Typically, a student will respond that perhaps she 
really did smell bad.  To this assertion, I respond: “In other words, he 
told the truth.  For the torts of libel and slander, truth is a complete defense. 
If I say or write something injurious to the reputation of the plaintiff, for 
example, I accuse him of engaging in illegal or immoral activity, I can
avoid tort liability by establishing that I spoke the truth.  Should truth 
also be a defense to an action for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress?”  While they are thinking about this question, trying 
to determine how to respond, I move away from the podium and address 
them directly:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury: The defendant says he told the truth.  He
seeks to cloak himself in a mantle of truth—to shield himself from liability by
hiding behind a facade of truth.  But I will tell you another truth.  My client, Mrs. 
Slocum—Mrs. Julia Slocum—was an elderly, homeless woman in a weakened
physical condition, living on the streets of our city. She had no comfortable bed on
which she could rest her weary bones at night.  She had no shower to cleanse
her filthy body.  Yes, she was poor—but she was honest!  And after she had
scrimped and saved enough money to buy a can of beans to sustain her humble 
existence for yet another day, she walked proudly into that Food Fair store 
prepared to make her purchase.  And when she did so, she was entitled to be 
treated with the respect that you or I or any other customer in that store is
entitled to be treated.
The truth, ladies and gentlemen, is that this is a case about robbery.  When
the defendant’s clerk insulted Mrs. Slocum, he robbed her of her health.  You 
have heard the testimony of three extremely reliable eye witnesses—a priest, a
rabbi, and a minister—who were attending an interfaith ecumenical convention
in our city and who just happened to be in that store at the time of the incident. 
They informed you that they overheard the defendant insult Mrs. Slocum and 
saw her clutch at her chest and immediately collapse in response to the clerk’s
remark. You have heard the testimony of forensic experts who informed you
that given the timing of this sequence of events, the inescapable conclusion is
that Mrs. Slocum’s heart attack was directly caused by the clerk’s gross insult.
But that is only part of the injury that Mrs. Slocum suffered.  When the
defendant’s clerk insulted Mrs. Slocum, he not only robbed her of her health, he 
also robbed her of her dignity, her pride, her self-respect.  As a customer in that 
store, she was entitled to receive respectful treatment.  She did not receive it!  I 
call upon you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as the representatives of a decent
and civilized society, to say to this defendant: “We are outraged!  We will not 
allow you to insult with impunity our sister.  When you insulted Mrs. Slocum, you
insulted us. When you harmed her, you harmed us. You have done wrong, and
for the injury caused by your transgression, you must pay!” 
Suddenly, the discussion develops a whole new tone.  No longer is this a
silly little case about some greedy plaintiff represented by some
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unscrupulous attorney who is seeking money damages for a perceived
insult. Mrs. Slocum is not merely a name in an appellate case.  She is a 
flesh and blood person who is entitled to be treated with the same respectful 
treatment that we all wish to be accorded.  The students empathize with 
her. They are angered—outraged—by the employee’s insensitivity. No
longer is Mrs. Slocum viewed as someone who is seeking to recover for a
trivial or nonexistent mental affront.  She claims that she suffered a heart
attack as a direct result of the insulting language, and she presented 
convincing evidence that her claim was genuine.
My closing argument was addressed to my students sitting as jurors, 
not as law students. They were not asked, as future lawyers, to develop
an argument that would appeal to jurors.  They were not asked to
intellectually analyze the strength of the argument I presented.  At least
initially, they reacted emotionally as jurors in the case.  The question to 
be asked was whether, if the case had gone to trial and they were jurors 
who heard the evidence that I said was presented, they would have ruled 
for the plaintiff?  The answer was a resounding “yes.”  Only after they
experienced an emotional response to my closing argument, would I 
allow the class to return to other issues: Was it appropriate for the court 
to dismiss her claim even if the defendant’s insult actually caused such a
severe injury?  Was she really homeless, and could she prove that she 
suffered a heart attack?  Did the professor make up the facts?  I inform 
the class that because the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, it was appropriate for me to assume that 
the plaintiff could prove what she alleged and to make up facts that 
would most strongly support her claim.
Finally, to complete our discussion, I explain why I made this
impassioned closing argument to the jury.  First, I wanted to demonstrate 
to the class that while we talk about the legal principles that decide appellate 
cases, they need to understand that lawsuits deal with real people and the 
problems they face.  Second, I wanted to demonstrate the significance of
a court order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 
The court is ruling as a matter of law that even if the plaintiff is able to
prove what he or she alleges to be the facts, the law does not support the 
plaintiff’s winning the case.  No matter how strong the evidence supporting 
the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff loses on a point of law. So I wanted to 
present the class with the type of evidence that the plaintiff might be 
able to present if the court allowed the plaintiff’s claim to proceed and to 
demonstrate just how powerful that evidence could be if the jury were
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permitted to decide the case.  Third, I wanted to demonstrate the significance 
of legal arguments. I had previously suggested to the class that in the 
future, courts may be willing to extend the duty of courtesy owed by
common carriers and hotels to other businesses open to the public.  After
all, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires all places of public accommodation 
to serve customers without discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
or national origin.64  That law imposes this duty of service not only on 
common carriers and hotels but also on restaurants, movie theaters,
sports arenas, and other places of exhibition or entertainment.  If in the 
future, courts extend a duty of courtesy to all businesses open to the
public, then I as a trial attorney have a powerful argument to make to the
jury on behalf of my client, Mrs. Slocum, particularly if I am able to
prove that she suffered some really significant injury, such as a heart
attack. She was not treated with the courtesy and respect that was owed
to her as a customer in the defendant’s store. 
C. Negligence: The Applicable Standard of Care 
1. The Reasonable Person Standard:    
Gender Neutral or Gender Specific? 
In Vaughan v. Menlove,65 decided in 1837, the Court of Common Pleas
adopted the reasonable man test as the standard of care to determine 
whether a party acted negligently.  The casebook authors note that 
although historically the masculine gender was used, “[o]bviously, this 
form of description is now outdated. The form used [today] . . . is the 
reasonable, prudent person.”66 
I raise the highly emotional issue of whether men and women should
be held to the same standard of care or whether the standard should be 
gender specific. To do so, I begin by reading an excerpt from A.P.
Herbert, who wrote a whimsical description of “the Reasonable Man.”67 
Herbert tells us that “[h]e is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)–(b) (2006).  I suggest to the class an alternative 
explanation for the insult to Mrs. Slocum.  Perhaps she was not a homeless person, but 
rather, was an African American person who the clerk did not want to serve in the store. 
After all, the incident occurred in the Deep South—Florida—and the Supreme Court of 
Florida issued its opinion in 1958—six years prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 
65. (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ct. Com. Pl.). 
66. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 54, at 148. 
67. A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 1–6 (10th prtg. 1964). 
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those qualities which we demand of the good citizen.”68  After giving
numerous examples, Herbert asserts: 
Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving
vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill-nature, avarice, and absence of mind,
as careful for his own safety as he is for that of others, this excellent but odious
character stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to
his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example.69 
But then comes the shocker.  Herbert writes: “[I]n all that mass of
authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single
mention of a reasonable woman.”70  Male students in the class are amused; 
female students are offended. I tell the class that if I ask the men why
women do not find the statement amusing, they will respond that women 
do not have a sense of humor.  If I ask the women why men are not 
offended by the statement, they will respond that men are jerks. 
I then dare to ask what I describe as the unaskable question: “Should 
women be held to a different standard of care than men?  In other words,
should the reasonable person standard be gender specific? Consider, for 
example, the everyday act of driving a car.  Should women drivers be 
held to the standard of the reasonable woman driver or to the standard of 
the reasonable person driver?” After we engage in a brief discussion of 
this issue, I then say, “I’m going to offer you some evidence that you
may wish to consider in deciding the appropriate standard of care to be
applied to women drivers.”  The “evidence” that I offer comes from three 
newspaper articles,71 one written in 1975, one in 1998, and one in 2007.
The 1975 article is entitled Male Drivers Make More Errors, and it 
states:
Men drivers tend to overrate their own abilities and make driving errors
because of that rating, while women are fairly accurate in describing their driving, a
study by a research firm here showed. 
68. Id. at 2. 
69. Id. at 4. 
70. Id. at 5. 
71. I frequently use newspaper articles to make a point to the class.  When I hold 
up a newspaper article and read from it, the students pay close attention.  A newspaper article, 
written by laypersons about some event or facts that do not directly involve a court decision,
offers a welcome respite from the rather sterile recitation of facts typically found in 
appellate court opinions.  And yet, I am able to use the article to provide information that
is pertinent to our discussion of a legal issue. 
 485
MORRIS I PRE-AUTHOR PAGES 7/16/2010 11:19 AM     
 
 
      
   
     
  
    
    
      
  
 
   
       
 
       
      
  
    
    
 
 
    
    
 
     
 









    
 
  
The $100,000, 18-month study by Capspan Corp. concluded that men tend to
drive faster and more aggressively than women because they think they are
better drivers, study director Roy S. Rice said. 
But Rice said the study of 100 drivers in all age groups showed that the men
who drove the most aggressively also failed more driver tests.
Surprisingly, it was not the youngest male drivers who were most aggressive 
and drove fastest, but the male drivers from 25–45 years old, Rice said. The
researcher said men under 25 ranked second to the middle group in aggressiveness
and errors. Older men ranked third, followed by young women, middle-aged
women and older women, he said.72 
The 1998 article is entitled Men and Driving: They Just Don’t Mix, 
and it begins as follows: 
  If you must drive, don’t drink testosterone. 
That stuff could be the most dangerous substance being abused on the highways
today.
Either that or men are just awful drivers. Maybe they’re not equipped for 
handling big, fast, internal combustion vehicles. 
It turns out that male drivers are—statistically—a greater menace than female
drivers by far to everybody on the road, including themselves.
 . . . .
Men account for little more than 50 percent of licensed drivers and women 
for just more than 49 percent—close to an even split—but the risk of being
involved in a fatal crash is three times higher for males. 
. . . .
Here’s a reason: Of the men involved in fatal crashes, 28 percent had blood-
alcohol concentrations of .01 or greater (meaning some alcoholic drinking)
compared with 15 percent of women. 
And another 21 percent of men in these accidents had blood-alcohol readings
of .10 or greater (meaning they were legally drunk) compared with 11 percent 
of women drivers. 
“Proportionally, twice as many males were legally drunk as females,” says
Alan Hoskins, a statistician with the National Safety Council.  “Among younger male 
drivers especially, the combination of two substances, alcohol and testosterone, 
is pretty deadly.”73 
The 2007 article is entitled Road Risk Higher for Male Drivers, and it 
begins as follows: “That age-old stereotype about dangerous female 
drivers is shattered in a big, new traffic analysis: Male drivers have a 77
percent higher risk of dying in a car accident than women, based on 
miles driven.”74 
Suddenly, the tables have been turned.  Now the women have the upper
hand.  I revise the inquiry: “Perhaps, instead of focusing on women drivers,
72. Male Drivers Make More Errors, EVENING TRIB. (San Diego), July 7, 1975, at D5. 
73. John Lang, Men and Driving: They Just Don’t Mix, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 19, 1998, at D3. 
74. Seth Borenstein, Road Risk Higher for Male Drivers, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Jan. 19, 2007, at A1. 
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we should be asking whether men drivers should be held to the reasonable
man driver standard or whether they should be held to the higher
standard of the reasonable woman driver.  After all, if that higher standard is
applied, we can achieve the socially beneficial result of significantly 
fewer auto accidents and the deaths and injuries that occur in those
accidents.”
After an extended discussion of this proposal, I give an explanation of
why I believe the gender-neutral, reasonable person standard is applied 
in negligence cases. Although the reasonable person only exercises
reasonable care, he or she exercises that care all the time.  In determining
the appropriate conduct in any situation, society asks what a reasonable 
person would do, not what men or women actually do in that situation. 
In driving a car, a reasonable person would obey the posted speed limit, 
would signal turns, would not be distracted by a cell phone, radio, or
conversation with passengers, and would not drive after drinking alcohol.
The reasonable person is a hypothetical being who never acts negligently.
Perhaps that is what A.P. Herbert was describing when he said that the
reasonable person is “devoid . . . of any human weakness.”75  The reasonable 
person “is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities 
which we demand of the good citizen.”76 
2. The Reasonable Person Standard Contrasted with 
the Economic Person Standard 
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,77 Judge Learned Hand 
explained in algebraic terms when an actor is negligent.  If the burden of 
precaution to avoid the injury is less than the gravity of the injury 
multiplied by the probability of its occurrence, the actor who fails to take 
that precaution has acted negligently.78  Law and economics scholars
75. HERBERT, supra note 67, at 4. 
76. Id. at 2. 
77. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
78. Id. at 173 (“[L]iability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:
i.e., whether B < PL.”).  In Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge
Hand presented a revised formula: “It is indeed possible to state an equation for negligence in
the form, C = P X D, in which the C is the care required to avoid risk, D, the possible
injuries, and P, the probability that the injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not
taken.”  Judge Hand cautioned, however, that the factors cannot be measured precisely, 
and that attempts to do so “are illusory; and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center 
attention upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.”  Id.
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have used Judge Hand’s formula to determine when it is economically
appropriate to find an actor negligent. Judge Richard A. Posner, in an
article that my students read, writes: “[T]he dominant function of the 
fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring
about, at least approximately, the efficient—the cost-justified—level of
accidents and safety.”79 
In a class devoted to exploring Judge Hand’s formula and the propriety of
a law and economics approach that equates the economic person with the
reasonable person—inefficiency equals blameworthiness—we discuss
excerpts from an article entitled The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, written by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner.80  The authors
analyze Eckert v. Long Island Railroad Co.,81 translating the court’s
opinion into economic terms.  In Eckert, a jury found that the defendant’s 
train was traveling at excessive speed in a highly populated area, and its 
swift approach imperiled a young child sitting or standing on the tracks. 
Plaintiff’s intestate attempted to rescue the child but was struck by the 
train and killed.82  In determining whether the railroad should be held
liable for its negligence or whether the deceased’s conduct constituted 
contributory negligence that would bar recovery, the authors, applying
an economic analysis, ask whether the railroad would have decided to “buy” 
the rescuer’s services. Assuming that the child’s life and the rescuer’s 
life have roughly the same value, the question of whether the rescuer
was contributorily negligent becomes a question of whether the rescuer
probably could have saved the child without serious injury to himself.83 
I ask students whether courts should be making decisions this way.
For example, suppose there is an old, feeble person who is imperiled on 
the tracks due to the railroad’s running its train at excessive speed in a
densely populated area.  Do we want the court to determine whether a 
person who attempts to rescue the old person is contributorily negligent 
by asking whether the negligent railroad would have decided to buy the 
potential rescuer’s services?  Arguably they would not because the value 
of the old person’s life may be significantly less than the potential
rescuer’s life.
79. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
Judge Posner also wrote: “[A] negligence standard of liability, properly administered, is 
broadly consistent with an optimum investment in accident prevention by the enterprises
subject to the standard.”  Id. at 30.
80. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 896–98 (1981). 
81. 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). 
82. Id. at 503–04. 
83. Landes & Posner, supra note 80, at 897–98. 
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I pose the fundamental question: “Should all human life be valued 
equally or should some lives be considered more valuable than others?”
Students are troubled by the inquiry. Our Declaration of Independence 
heralds the self-evident truth that we are all created equal. And yet, 
what if in my hypothetical there are two railroad tracks and the rescuer
could save either the old person or the child?  Who would society want 
him to save?  What if there is an auto accident and two people suffer a
similar injury?  If they are brought to a hospital that has a machine that 
can save the life of either the old person or the child, how does the
hospital decide who gets the one machine—flip a coin?  I also read a
newspaper article to the class that is entitled Age Called Factor in Heart 
Treatment, which begins as follows: “People over age 75 are significantly 
less likely than younger patients to receive certain life-saving treatments
for heart attacks, researchers . . . have found.”84  The article reports that a 
“study of heart-attack patients found that those over age 75 were 12
times less likely than patients under 65 to receive ‘clot-busting’ drugs to 
treat their condition, and seven times less likely to undergo the artery-
clearing procedure balloon angioplasty.”85  I also read a portion of a
more recent newspaper article about the advantages of “[c]oronary stents 
laced with the new drug sirolimus [that] are far less likely to cause
obstructive artery scarring than older, uncoated stents.”86  The article 
also reports: “But many doctors say the price of the tiny device—five
times greater than plain stents—is limiting which patients will get
them.”87 
As a part of our discussion, I read a brief excerpt from A.P. Herbert’s
essay in which he compares the reasonable man with the economic man.
“This noble creature[, that is, the Reasonable Man,] stands in singular 
contrast to his kinsman the Economic Man whose every action is
prompted by the single spur of selfish advantage, and directed to the single
end of monetary gain.”88  In other words, because the economic person 
84. Age Called Factor in Heart Treatment, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 23, 
1994, at A-7.
85. Id.
 86. Cheryl Clark, Drug-Coated Stents Less Likely To Lead to Scarring, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 2, 2003, at B3.  Although this article is listed as appearing on B3, the 
page was erroneously numbered.  The article appears on the first page of Section B,
which should have been numbered B1. 
87. Id.
 88. HERBERT, supra note 67, at 2. 
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thinks in terms of maximizing profits and reducing costs, that person 
will employ only the minimum protections necessary to avoid liability.
In contrast, the reasonable person does what is right.  As applied to my
hypothetical based on the Eckert case, the reasonable person, seeing
someone—whether a young child or an elderly person—in imminent 
danger of being struck by a train, would attempt a rescue even if it
endangered the rescuer’s own life, provided that there was at least some
possibility that the rescuer would be able to avoid being killed in the 
process.  Under such circumstances, the rescue attempt would not be
foolhardy, and the rescuer would not be found contributorily negligent for
making the attempted rescue.89  The class engages in an extended
discussion of whether Herbert is correct in distinguishing the motivation 
of the reasonable person—to do what is right—from the motivation of the
economic person—to do what is efficient—and whether the result in any
case would be the same regardless of the actor’s motivation. 
The class also discusses Landes and Posner’s formulation of how the
issue of the rescuer’s contributory negligence should be determined, that 
is, whether the railroad would have decided to “buy” the rescuer’s 
services. The railroad was negligent initially in endangering the child’s
life. Should society defer to that negligent defendant’s judgment as to
whether it wished to purchase the rescuer’s attempt to rescue, or should 
society exercise its value judgment to preserve a life in peril by 
encouraging a potential rescuer to act?  Do we really want a potential 
rescuer to weigh the value of his or her life versus the life of the
imperiled victim before deciding whether to attempt a rescue, or do we
want that potential rescuer to consider only whether the likelihood of 
injury or death to himself or herself is so great that it is foolhardy to 
make a rescue attempt?
3. The Standard of Care for Physicians 
In studying the standard of care applied to physicians, students learn
that the reasonable person standard of care is equated to the standard of 
practice of the ordinary physician.90  In essence, the profession establishes 
its own standard of care as embodied by the actual practice of physicians
89. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871) (“The law 
has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it,
unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent 
persons.”).
90. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 54, at 170 n.2 (stating that professionals are expected
to possess and exercise “the knowledge, training, and skill (or ability and competence) of
an ordinary member of the profession in good standing”).
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generally. Thus, unlike manufacturers of products and businesses
who are held to the standard of care of the hypothetical reasonable 
manufacturer or the hypothetical reasonable business person,91 for
physicians and other professionals, customary care equals reasonable
care. The law’s deference to the customary practice of professionals 
assumes that the customary standard of practice of the profession is
sufficiently high to adequately protect people serviced by professionals
from misconduct by individual practitioners.  In class, I challenge that 
assumption.  I read excerpts from several newspaper articles that I have
collected over the years demonstrating that the ordinary physician often 
adheres to customs that do not incorporate the latest studies and 
recommended practices.  For example, one article is entitled Report Puts 
Hospital Deaths from Preventable Errors at 195,000 and begins as follows:
“The number of hospital patients who die from preventable errors may
be twice as high as previously estimated and shows no sign of
decreasing . . . . The findings would make medical mistakes the third-
leading cause of death in the country, behind heart disease and cancer.”92 
Another article reports: 
Postoperative infections, surgical wounds that accidentally reopen and other
often-preventable complications lead to more than 32,000 U.S. hospital deaths 
and more than $9 billion in extra costs annually . . . . The findings greatly
underestimate the problem, since many other complications happen that are not 
listed in hospital administrative data, the researchers said.93 
After four infants died from a bacterial infection transmitted in a hospital, a
newspaper reported:
Surveys consistently show that less than half [of doctors and other health-care workers]
routinely wash up, even though “Clean hands are the single most important factor in
preventing the spread of dangerous germs and antibiotic resistance in health-
care settings,” according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Further, it says, “Each year nearly 2 million patients in the United States get an
infection in hospitals, and about 90,000 of these patients die as a result.” 
. . . .
91. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (“What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is 
fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.”).
92. Scott Allen, Report Puts Hospital Deaths from Preventable Errors at 195,000, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 2004, at A6. 
93. Lindsey Tanner, Annual Death Toll from Post-Surgery Complications Put at
32,000, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 8, 2003, at A15. 
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[H]ospital infections kill more than twice as many Americans as breast cancer
or motor vehicle accidents and almost six times as many as AIDS.94 
But the problems of customary medical practice are not limited to
injuries and deaths in hospital settings.  One newspaper article reported: 
“One after another, blockbuster-selling drugs are being yanked off 
the market for killing or injuring Americans.  Many were banned because 
doctors ignored safety warnings and prescribed them to the wrong
patients . . . .”95  Another article reported: 
Cholesterol-lowering drugs known as statins that can help prevent heart 
disease remain under-prescribed for many at-risk patients . . . . 
. . . .
“Only 50 percent of high-risk patients who visit doctors receive statins,” said
study author Dr. Jun Ma, a research associate at the Stanford Prevention Research
Center.  “People may die prematurely because of inadequate treatment.”96 
Three years ago, an article in Parade magazine identified misdiagnosis 
as the most dangerous medical mistake.97  The article quoted Dr. Jerome 
Groopman, Chief of Experimental Medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess 
Medical Center in Boston, as saying: “An astounding 15% of all patients 
who enter a hospital or doctor’s office this year will be misdiagnosed, 
about half will face serious complications, even death.”98  A year later, 
Parade magazine reported: “Prescription drug errors injure 1.5 million 
Americans every year and kill at least 7000.  Why? Because 95% of the 
3 billion prescriptions issued annually are handwritten, leading to mistakes.
So far, most physicians . . . have not supported what many say is the 
solution: an electronic prescription system.”99 
To demonstrate that customary medical practices are not always
altered by knowledge of problems caused by that practice, I discuss the 
incidence of deliveries by Caesarean section. In the period of 1968 to
1977, the rate of births by Caesarean section tripled—from 5% of all
deliveries to 15.2%.100  In 1984, Dr. Norbert Gleicher, Chair of the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Mount Sinai Hospital
94. Michael Fumento, Editorial, The Threat of Hospital Infections, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 7, 2004, at B8. 
95. Lauran Neergaard, Doctors Ordered: Read the Drug Label, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Dec. 12, 2000, at A5. 
96. Justin M. Norton, Statins Underprescribed for Many At-Risk Heart Patients, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 31, 2005, at A5. 
97. The Most Dangerous Medical Mistake, PARADE, Apr. 1, 2007, at 16. 
98. Id.
99. Rx for Medicine Mistakes, PARADE, Jan. 20, 2008, at 10. 
100. Doctor Says Caesareans Expose Women to Needless Risks, Expense, TRIBUNE
(San Diego), Dec. 21, 1984, at A-40. 
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Medical Center in Chicago and a professor at Rush Medical College,
stated, “[I]n general the risk of maternal death is two to four times
greater in the surgical procedure [than in vaginal delivery].”101  Despite
repeated reports recommending that the use of the surgical procedure be
limited to appropriate cases––due to the increased risk of harm both to
the infant and to the mother––the rate of deliveries by Caesarean section 
increased to 22.6% in 1992102 and to 29% in 2003.103  A newspaper 
article published in 2007 reported: “U.S. women are dying from childbirth 
at the highest rate in decades, government figures show.  Though the risk
of death is very small, experts believe increasing maternal obesity and a
jump in Caesarean sections are partly to blame.”104  Dr. Elliott Main, 
who co-chairs a panel that reviews obstetrics care in California, stated:
“There’s an inherent risk to C-sections . . . .  As you do thousands and
thousands of them, there’s going to be a price.”105 
Students have different emotional reactions to these articles.  Some,
especially those who have had favorable experiences with their doctors, 
may be surprised or even suspicious of the accuracy of the reports.
Some may feel anxiety or even fear as they consider medical treatment
for a condition they have or may have in the future.  Others, especially 
those who have had unfavorable experiences with their doctors, may feel 
hostility toward or resentful of members of the medical profession. 
Whatever their emotional reaction, students are eager to engage in a
discussion of whether the standard of care for physicians requiring 
conformity to the medical custom should be replaced by the reasonable 
physician standard or by some other standard.
D. Negligence: Limitations on Duty To Act 
After considerable class time is devoted to discussing the reasonable
person standard as the measure of care required to avoid a determination
of negligence, we turn to situations in which a defendant avoids tort 
liability, not because he or she exercised reasonable care, but rather, 
101. Id.
102. Caesarean Rate Called Excessive, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 19, 1994, at 
A-8. 
103. Mike Stobbe, Maternal Death Rate Is Highest in Years, SAN DIEGO UNION-
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because he or she was under no duty to exercise reasonable care.
Students are always troubled by these cases because, as a general rule,
the law requires people to act reasonably to avoid injuring others. 
However, in these special situations, for some policy reason, an innocent
plaintiff cannot recover for his or her injuries despite the defendant’s 
unreasonable behavior.
1. The Failure To Rescue
We begin our discussion with Hegel v. Langsam.106  In Hegel, parents
of a seventeen-year-old, first-year undergraduate student sued the 
university she attended, claiming that the university allowed their 
daughter “to become associated with criminals, to be seduced, to become 
a drug user and further allowed her to be absent from her dormitory and 
failed to return her to her parents’ custody on demand.”107  The  court  
held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action, ruling that the
university is under no “duty to regulate the private lives of [its] students,
to control their comings and goings and to supervise their associations.”108 
Students attending a university “must be presumed to have sufficient 
maturity to conduct their own personal affairs.”109 
I ask the class whether the case was properly decided.  Law students, 
most of whom have recently graduated from college, readily agree with 
the court’s decision. The university should not interfere in the lives of 
its students even if parents believe their children have fallen into errant
ways. 
In our subsequent discussion, students learn the broader principle of 
the case—that one who has not created a new danger to the plaintiff is
under no obligation to assist the plaintiff who is endangered from another 
source.  I then challenge that principle by reading portions of a newspaper 
article entitled Bystanders Fail To Help Toddlers Floating in Pool.110 
At least two bystanders failed to help two toddlers found floating face down
in an apartment swimming pool, and a fire department official said he was
baffled by their inaction.
“Anybody in their right mind—you’d think they would, but they didn’t,” said
Capt. C.A. Beasley.
106. 273 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1971). 
107. Id. at 352. 
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Bystanders Fail To Help Toddlers Floating in Pool, EVENING TRIB. (San 
Diego), July 18, 1989 (on file with author).  The fact situation occurred in Houston, 
Texas, and another version of the story appeared a day earlier in the Houston Chronicle. 
Toddler Drowns After Onlookers Do Nothing, HOUSTON CHRON., July 17, 1989, at A1. 
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Beasley said two men stood by while Taffidie McGough, 2, and her 15-month-
old half-sister, Tiffidie Anne, were [drowning] in the pool.
Tiffidie Anne was found floating face down in the shallow end of the pool 
and was declared dead at the scene.
Taffidie was on the bottom of the pool near her sister. . . . She remains in
critical condition and on life-support systems at Texas Children’s Hospital . . . . 
District Attorney John B. Holmes said there are no criminal sanctions for 
failing to rescue the children.
“But common sense suggests that no caring, thinking human being would stand
handily by while two kids were drowning,” he said.111 
I reiterate the statements of Captain Beasley and District Attorney 
Holmes.  “Anybody in their right mind—you’d think they would [act to
rescue those children], but they didn’t.”  “[C]ommon sense suggests that 
no caring, thinking human being would stand handily by while two kids 
were drowning.”  Tort law, I remind the students, is supposed to encourage 
people to engage in reasonable behavior.  Is it reasonable to stand by and 
allow two young children to die without attempting to rescue them?
Why do we have tort law if liability cannot be imposed in this situation? 
The students are stunned, and they are stumped.  The principle of law 
that they so readily adopted as compelling the result in the Hegel case
seems to compel a result of no liability in the drowning toddlers case.  In 
fact, Hegel may present an even stronger case for imposing liability than 
the drowning toddlers case.  After all, there was some relationship between 
the parties in Hegel. The plaintiff’s daughter was a student at the
111. Bystanders Fail To Help Toddlers Floating in Pool, supra note 110. The 
drowning toddlers situation is not unique.  Consider, for example, this report of
an incident occurring more than twenty years later: 
The gang rape and beating of a 15-year-old girl on school grounds 
after her homecoming dance was horrific enough.  But even more shocking, 
police said, was that up to two dozen people watched and did nothing to stop
it.
 . . . .
Two suspects were in custody yesterday, but police said as many as seven 
ranging in age from 15 to mid-20s beat and raped the girl for more than two 
hours at a dimly lit area near benches Saturday night. As many as two dozen
people saw the rape without notifying police.
Officers found the girl semi-conscious and naked from the waist down near 
a picnic table.  She remains hospitalized with non-life-threatening injuries. 
“This was a barbaric act.  I still cannot get my head around the fact that
numerous people either watched, walked away or participated in her assault,” 
Lt. Mark Gagan said yesterday. “It’s one of the most disturbing crimes in my
15 years as a police officer.”
Terry Collins, Town Rattled by Alleged Rape of Teen, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 28,
2009, at A3. 
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university. In the drowning toddlers example, there is no indication of any 
relationship between the children and the bystanders who did not come to
their rescue.  And yet, students are sympathetic to, and even compelled
by, the idea that no caring, thinking human being—no reasonable 
person—would stand handily by while two kids were drowning.  They
feel contempt toward the two bystanders who failed to act. 
I ask whether the legislature should change the common law rule by
imposing a duty to rescue.112  I give them a specific example.  I ask, 
“How many of you would support the enactment of legislation that 
declares a person to be guilty of criminal conduct if he or she either fails 
‘to render aid which is necessary and is clearly required immediately to a 
person in danger of death, if such aid could knowingly be rendered by
the guilty person without serious danger to himself or to other persons, 
or [fails] to inform the appropriate [authorities] or persons of the 
necessity to render aid’?”
After the class considers the merits of the proposal and votes on 
whether it should be adopted, I inform them that the legislation I quoted 
was contained in the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic.113  Ironically, we regard our society as being morally
based, reflecting Judeo-Christian ethical precepts. And yet, Godless
Communism appeared more willing to call upon its citizens to act as 
their brother’s keepers. Each Soviet citizen was expected to take an
interest in the welfare of his or her fellow citizens and to offer assistance
to anyone who needed it. 
I then offer a different perspective.  Perhaps, it could be argued, that 
Soviet law was ever ready to resort to criminal legislation as an
instrument of social engineering. In the United States, we are free to
accept or reject our moral obligations—at least the moral obligation to 
assist a person in danger—without any fear of either criminal or civil
liability.
112. For example, a Vermont statute imposes a duty on any person who knows that 
another is exposed to grave physical harm to give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person to the extent that such assistance can be rendered without danger or peril to the 
rescuer.  Willful violation of that statute, however, results in a maximum fine of only $100.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2009).  The statute was enacted in 1967. Id.
113. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR [UK RSFSR] [RSFSR Criminal Code] art. 127
(Russ.), translated in The Criminal Code of the RSFSR, in  THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW
53, 108 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980). 
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2. The Failure To Rescue: Revisited
About a week after our discussion of the Hegel case, I hold a special
lunch and learn session for the class.114  I inform students that as we 
dine, they will see a video of a lawyer-client interview based on the facts
of Hegel v. Langsam. I ask them to consider what issues they might
expect to encounter if they were attorneys interviewing the plaintiff in
that case and how they would handle those issues.  In the video, I portray
the father who wants to sue the university where his daughter attended.
The lawyer in the interview is portrayed by a clinical law professor on 
our faculty.
I begin the interview by informing the lawyer that I am really upset.  I 
am concerned about my daughter.  In a matter of a couple of months— 
since she started attending that university—her whole life has changed. 
She is drinking alcoholic beverages; she is taking drugs; she is running 
around with a guy who is seven years older than she is; she stays out all 
night and does not return to her dorm room.  And the university is not
doing anything to protect her, to guide her, to take care of her.  They do
not have any rules.  When the lawyer asks me what I would like to achieve, 
I inform him that I would like to close down that den of iniquity, and
that I would like to sue those bastards for every cent they have. The
students see me as an emotionally distraught father, angrily blaming the 
university for my daughter’s plight. Although the lawyer attempts to
make me focus on specific issues—did the university agree to monitor 
my daughter’s life; was there any language in their brochures that could
be construed as an undertaking on their part; what was the specific date 
that I attempted unsuccessfully to visit my daughter—I continue my
emotional harangue. 
After the students see the video, the first question I ask is: “How
would you like to be my daughter?”  The students respond with a 
resounding “No way!”  We then discuss the plight of the lawyer confronted
by an extremely emotional client.  Did the client’s emotional outbursts 
make the attorney uncomfortable or ill at ease?  Given the circumstances, 
did the attorney do a good job in trying to get the client to focus on 
114. The University of San Diego has adopted an Enhanced Student-Faculty Interaction
Initiative (ESFI) that provides funds to professors who wish to meet informally with 
their students on special occasions that have some educational merit.  I provide pizza and
drinks to the students who attend.  Virtually all students in the class attend the session. 
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factual information that might assist the attorney in evaluating legal 
issues that might be relevant to a potential claim?  Would they have 
handled the interview any differently?  Although the students do not 
personally experience the emotions that the client experiences, or the 
emotions that the attorney experiences in trying to interview the emotional 
client, nevertheless, for many students, this is the first time they have 
considered problems caused by emotions that they may well confront 
when they become members of the profession they are so eager to join. 
While they know the court in Hegel ruled that the plaintiff failed to state 
a cause of action against the university, how do they deal with an 
emotionally distraught client who is coming to see them, confident in the 
lawyer’s ability to achieve success for them on a similar grievance?
We discuss what the lawyer was trying to achieve in the interview. 
For example, when the attorney informed me that he was confident that
he would be able to compel the university to take a more active role in 
my daughter’s life, was he simply trying to “sell” himself as competent 
to represent my interests?  Would he regret making such a statement that
I could construe as a promise, a promise that he might well be unable to 
keep? Could my disappointment in my attorney’s inability to achieve 
this objective lead to a claim of malpractice by me against him?
We also consider the distinction between sympathy and empathy.115 
In the context of the interview, sympathy suggests that the lawyer feels
compassion toward, or pity for, the client because of the client’s situation or
problem.116  A lawyer who is sympathetic toward his or her client might
propose a legal course of action that would enable the client to achieve a
result that would lessen or eliminate the client’s suffering.  The lawyer is
especially likely to seek a legal solution to the client’s problem if the
client also views his or her problem as a legal problem. In the example I
presented, when I indicated that I wanted to close down the university 
and sue them for damages, the lawyer construed my problem as a legal 
problem by expressing confidence in his ability to make the university 
take a more active role in my daughter’s life. 
In contrast, empathy suggests that the lawyer understands the client’s
perspective.117 An empathetic lawyer may be more willing to explore a 
115. See Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO 
L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 136–37, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/BANDES 
_2009_133.pdf (discussing the distinction between sympathy and empathy). 
116. Id. at 136. 
117. Id. Bandes asserts: “Cognitive empathy is perspective-taking.  The rarer emotional 
empathy, a kind of emotional contagion, ‘makes us experience others’ suffering as our 
own.’” Id. at 136 n.15 (citing CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 38 (1997)). 
498
MORRIS I PRE-AUTHOR PAGES 7/16/2010 11:19 AM     
  
























     
 
[VOL. 47:  465, 2010] Teaching with Emotion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
nonlegal solution to a client’s problem.  In the example I presented, the
lawyer may question whether suing the university, even if that suit is 
successful, will resolve the relationship problem that exists between my
daughter and me.  If a lawyer is able to build an empathetic connection 
with his or her client, the client may be more willing to accept the lawyer’s
advice that the lawyer believes will be helpful to the client—even if that
advice does not result in using the lawyer’s services to resolve the 
problem.  When the lawyer interrupted my explanation of why I came to
see him with questions that attempted to make me focus on specific
issues relevant to a possible legal claim against the university, did
he squander an opportunity to build an empathetic connection with his 
client by frustrating my desire to fully explain why I was so upset?
To complete our discussion, I suggest that an interview process,
modeled after the three stages outlined by David Binder and Susan Price 
in their book Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered
Approach,118 may provide guidance on how to conduct an improved
interview. In the first stage—The Preliminary Problem Identification— 
the client is provided with an opportunity to state, without interruption,
the problem and the relief that the client seeks.  In the second stage— 
Chronological Overview—the attorney goes back through the client’s 
story asking open-ended questions in order to elicit data and fill in blanks.
In the third stage—Theory Development and Verification—the lawyer 
explains to the client his or her understanding of the facts and issues 
involved and explores systematically the viability of legal theories 
suggested in the Overview stage. At this stage, the lawyer may also 
explore nonlegal options that may better assist the client to resolve the
“real” problem.
The class then observes another video of the same interview, but one 
in which the attorney employs the interviewing technique mentioned
above. For example, he begins by asking me to briefly discuss my
problem and what I hope to achieve.  Even though I become emotionally 
upset as I discuss my situation, he allows me to complete my remarks
without interrupting me.  Although in this interview, I try to be as 
disturbed as the client in the first interview, the technique of allowing 
me to complete my remarks without interruption enables me to focus on 
the attorney’s questions as he engages in the fact-gathering necessary to 
118. DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 53–103 (1977). 
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deal with my problem.  He has established a necessary rapport with me.
When the lawyer suggests that we may not be successful in a lawsuit
against the university unless we can establish some undertaking on their 
part to monitor or guide my daughter’s life, I am more willing to accept
that possibility than I was in the first interview.  The attorney has at least
listened to me—he is empathetic—and I am convinced he is trying to 
assist me in dealing with my difficult situation.  Even when he suggests
that part of my problem may be a relationship issue with my daughter 
that may benefit from professional counseling rather than a legal issue
that he can help me solve, I am receptive to the suggestion.  The two 
videos, and our class discussion, introduce students to issues they will 
study in far greater detail in an upper-class Interviewing and Counseling
119course. 
3. Attorney Duty of Confidentiality
In discussing the standard of care applicable to lawyers, I ask whether 
attorneys who violate the ethical standards of their profession—the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct Code— 
should be held liable in tort for an injury that results from such violation. 
The students readily accept that proposition.  After all, they have learned
that the customary standard of practice for professionals is equated with 
the reasonable person standard.120  If the profession itself imposes certain 
ethical standards of practice, then practitioners of that profession should 
be expected to conform to those standards. 
I then present students with an ethical dilemma.  Suppose the plaintiff
is injured in an automobile accident and sues the defendant driver.  As 
permitted under liberal discovery rules, you, as the defendant’s lawyer, 
require the plaintiff to undergo a physical examination by a physician
working for you in order to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. 
The physician discovers a serious condition—an aorta aneurysm— that was
probably caused by the accident.  The plaintiff’s own physician has not 
discovered this condition, and thus the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s attorney,
are unaware of the condition.121  If left untreated, this aneurysm could 
119. Just so the students do not leave the class with a mistaken impression of my
relationship with my real daughter, I show a third video that displays the father-daughter 
dance that we performed at my daughter’s wedding.  To the song “Boney Maroney,” we
do a silly routine that we developed prior to the wedding.  The audience at the wedding 
laughed.  So do the students. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 90–91. 
121. I tell students to assume that either this jurisdiction does not follow Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 35, which requires disclosure of the defendant’s physician’s report
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dilate further and rupture, resulting in the plaintiff’s death.122 You 
request permission from your client to inform the plaintiff of the condition. 
The defendant refuses to grant permission because he or she does not
want to be held liable for this additional injury.  I inform the class that
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent . . . .”123  In a comment to this rule, the ABA 
asserts: “A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is 
that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not
reveal information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to 
the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”124  Should
you, as the defendant’s attorney, betray your client and violate your 
ethical obligation as an attorney in order to assist the plaintiff?  If the
answer is yes, should you be held liable to the defendant for any 
additional damages that are assessed against him or her?
The students are quite disturbed by this hypothetical.  If they adhere to
the ethical requirements of their profession and do not disclose the
aneurysm, the plaintiff—admittedly an adversary, but a person 
nevertheless—may die. If they do disclose, they are breaching their 
ethical responsibility as attorneys and may be guilty of malpractice that
would make them personally liable for any additional damages that can
be assessed against their client.125  Some students try to find an easy way 
upon the request of the plaintiff, or that if the jurisdiction does follow that rule, then the
plaintiff has not made such request.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 35. 
122. The hypothetical is based on Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 
(Minn. 1962).  In Spaulding, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that although “no canon of
ethics or legal obligation may have required [the defendant or his lawyer] to inform plaintiff
or his counsel with respect [to the aneurysm],” nevertheless, because the plaintiff was a 
minor, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the settlement agreed to 
between the parties.  Id. at 710.  In a subchapter entitled “Who Among Us Will Do the 
Right Thing?,” the authors of a major casebook on professional responsibility reprint the 
Spaulding case and raise numerous questions about whether disclosure was “the right thing”
to do in that case. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 3– 
13 (4th ed. 2005). 
123. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). 
124. Id. cmt. 2. 
125. In a study conducted twenty years ago, twelve hypothetical problems involving
issues of whether the lawyer should disclose confidential information were submitted to
lawyers and clients.  One of the hypotheticals was based on the Spaulding case. Fred C. 
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 409 hypo. 3, 409 n.280 
(1989). Of the lawyers who responded, 67.3% said they would disclose the information 
about the aneurism to the plaintiff even if their client objected to the disclosure. Id. at
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out.  They say that if their client refuses to allow the disclosure, they will 
cease representing their client and then disclose the condition to the 
plaintiff. However, I inform them that the ABA Model Rules impose 
certain duties on attorneys toward their former clients.  Specifically, 
Rule 1.9(c) provides: “A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter . . . shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former client . . . or (2) reveal
information relating to the representation . . . .”126 
The hypothetical forces students to consider whether there are higher 
ethical obligations—potentially saving a person’s life—than the ethical
obligations of one’s profession—the duty of confidentiality to one’s
client. Indirectly, the discussion asks students to consider whether a rule
of law—such as an ethical rule of one’s profession, a broadly stated
court decision, or a legislative enactment—which has been promulgated
as a general standard applicable to most cases, should be adhered to in a 
new fact situation in which adherence may produce an unconsidered and 
undesirable result.  Perhaps that concern explains why the ABA amended 
its Model Rule 1.6 in 2003 to allow a lawyer to “reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.”127  Whether the facts of the hypothetical meet 
that standard for disclosure is uncertain. 
4. Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: Duty to Bystanders 
Traditionally, courts denied recovery to plaintiffs who suffered emotional 
distress from negligent conduct directed toward third persons.128  Because 
these bystander plaintiffs were outside the zone of physical danger, they
were classified as unforeseeable plaintiffs and owed no duty under 
Justice Cardozo’s reasoning in the landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long 
392 tbl.III.  Of the clients who responded, 91.2% said the defendant’s lawyer should disclose 
this information. Id. at 395 tbl.V.  Of the twelve hypotheticals, the Spaulding hypothetical
received the second highest percentage of prodisclosure responses from attorneys and the 
highest percentage of prodisclosure responses from clients.  Id. at 392 tbl.III, 395 tbl.V. 
The results of this study suggest that attorney disclosure in the Spaulding case conforms 
to the customary standard of practice of attorneys and is therefore not a breach of duty.  The 
results also suggest that if the issue is submitted to a jury in a lawsuit brought by the Spaulding
defendant against his or her attorney for the additional damages imposed against the defendant, 
the jury is unlikely to impose tort liability on the attorney who made the disclosure.
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c). 
127. Id. R. 1.6(b)(1). 
128. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 839 (2000). 
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Island Railroad Co.129 I begin my discussion of this unit by asking
whether a duty can be found when the plaintiff suffers emotional distress 
caused by the defendant’s negligence that endangers a third person.  For 
example, if the defendant endangers the life of a child, is it reasonably
foreseeable that the child’s mother will suffer emotional distress?  In
Wagner v. International Railway Co.,130 Cardozo found a duty to a
rescuer of a negligently injured third person.  If Cardozo can find a duty
to the rescuer, I can find a duty to the child’s mother in my hypothetical.
I then paraphrase Cardozo.  Instead of “Danger invites rescue. The cry of
distress is the summons to relief. . . . The wrong that imperils life is a 
wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer,”131 I 
suggest “Danger invites the concern of others. The cry of distress is the 
summons to mental disturbance of concerned loved ones . . . .  The  
wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong 
also to his mother.” If the students find my choice of words amusing, I 
note that in the very next sentence of the Wagner case, Cardozo states
that when a child is in danger, the child’s parent is its foreseeable
132rescuer. 
In 1968, the California Supreme Court broke from tradition by ruling 
that a mother who claimed that she had witnessed the death of her child 
as a result of the defendant’s negligent driving of an automobile stated a 
cause of action for the emotional injuries that she had suffered even
though she was not within the zone of physical danger.133  As the court 
stated in Dillon v. Legg: “The concept of the zone of danger cannot 
properly be restricted to the area of those exposed to physical injury; it
must encompass the area of those exposed to emotional injury.”134  If 
harm to the plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable—whether that harm is
physical injury or emotional distress—defendant is under a duty of 
129. 162 N.E. 99, 99–101 (N.Y. 1928). 
130. 133 N.E. 437, 437–38 (N.Y. 1921). 
131. Id. at 437. 
132. Citing Gibney v. State, 33 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1893), Cardozo writes, “The state 
that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable
also to the parent who plunges to its aid.” Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437–38. 
133. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968). 
134. Id. at 920 n.5. The court added: “[I]n awarding recovery for emotional shock
upon witnessing another’s injury or death, we cannot draw a line between the plaintiff 
who is in the zone of danger of physical impact and the plaintiff who is in the zone of
danger of emotional impact.” Id.
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reasonable care to avoid causing such injury.135 The court identified 
three factors that serve as guidelines to assist courts in determining 
whether emotional distress to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.136 
Over the years, most states have followed the California Supreme Court’s 
lead in replacing the zone of physical danger limitation with a rule that
permits recovery for emotional distress damages in at least some bystander 
137cases. 
In Thing v. La Chusa,138 decided twenty-one years after Dillon, the
California Supreme Court expressed concern that although the Dillon 
court had expected future cases to define the parameters of bystander
recovery, subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court and 
California Courts of Appeal had expanded liability by relaxing the
Dillon guidelines.139  Those decisions failed to consider “the importance 
of avoiding the limitless exposure to liability that the pure foreseeability
test of ‘duty’ would create and towards which these decisions have 
moved.”140  Thus the  Thing court ruled that for bystander plaintiffs,
“foreseeability of injury alone does not justify imposition of liability for
negligently caused emotional distress.”141  The court reformulated and 
narrowed the Dillon guidelines, and imposed them as requirements.  The 
Thing court concluded that a bystander plaintiff 
may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently
inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely
related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury producing
event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond
135. Id. at 920–21. 
136. The factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the 
accident, (2) whether the plaintiff contemporaneously observed the accident, and 
(3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related. Id. at 920. 
137. See DOBBS, supra note 128, at 840 & n.11 (citing cases decided by the highest 
appellate courts in fifteen states that follow the Dillon precedent); but see EDWARD J. KIONKA,
TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 331 (4th ed. 2005) (asserting that “most courts continue to deny
recovery” to bystander plaintiffs). Kionka acknowledges, however, that the rule of nonliability
to bystander plaintiffs “has been rejected in exceptionally compelling cases”—citing 
Dillon as the leading decision and noting that “Dillon has been followed in several 
jurisdictions in cases involving similar facts, but it has been expressly rejected in several 
others (e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, N.Y. 1969).”  KIONKA, supra, at 332 (citing Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969)). 
138. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 
139. Id. at 821.  See id. at 821–27 (discussing cases that expanded liability by relaxing 
the Dillon guidelines). 
140. Id. at 821. 
141. Id. at 827 (citing Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)). 
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that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an
abnormal response to the circumstances.142 
Thus, in the Thing case, the mother of a child who was injured when 
struck by a negligently driven automobile was not permitted to recover 
for the emotional distress she suffered when she arrived at the accident
scene shortly after the accident occurred and discovered her bloody and 
unconscious child lying in the roadway.143  The mother failed to satisfy
the rigid second requirement announced in Thing. 
I ask the class to consider whether the child’s mother was a foreseeable
plaintiff. Even though she did not witness the accident, she was in the
vicinity and arrived on the scene while her child, who she thought was 
dead when she first saw him, was lying unconscious and bleeding in the
roadway.144  Would a reasonable person in the defendant’s position foresee 
that if he or she drove negligently and seriously injured a child, that the 
child’s mother, upon discovering her child shortly after the accident,
would suffer serious emotional distress?  The obvious answer is “yes.” 
Should this mother’s claim be denied simply because she fails to satisfy
an arbitrary requirement that she be present at the scene of the injury-
producing event at the time it occurs and be aware at the time that it is 
causing injury to her child? Do we really believe that this mother’s 
claim of emotional distress is less likely to be genuine than the claim of
a mother who happened to see or hear the accident when it occurred? 
Shouldn’t the plaintiff be permitted to offer evidence to a jury to prove 
that she really did suffer serious emotional distress?
The students have a strong emotional reaction to the facts of the Thing
case—the child’s mother discovers her bloody, unconscious child in the 
road and believes him to be dead—and they support her quest for recovery. 
One could well assert that the students’ reaction is similar to the reaction
of appellate court judges to other compelling fact situations that arose 
after the Dillon decision. Such a reaction may have led those courts to 
expand bystander recovery by relaxing the Dillon guidelines.145 
142. Thing, 771 P.2d at 829–30 (footnotes omitted). 
143. Id. at 815. 
144. Id.
 145. The first Thing requirement that the bystander “be closely related to the injury
victim” may also be challenged as unduly arbitrary.  In a footnote, the Thing court explains
that requirement by stating: “Absent exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to
relatives residing in the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents 
of the victim.” Id. at 829 n.10.  Under this rule, while grandparents can recover for a negligent 
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I ask the class to consider whether their desire to grant recovery to 
Maria Thing is based solely on a desire to treat her equally with Margery 
Dillon. The broader question to be asked is whether they both should be 
granted a remedy for the emotional distress they had suffered or whether
they both should be denied recovery.  If the rigid Thing requirements are 
objectionable, should courts (1) return to the traditional rule of denying
recovery to both plaintiffs because they were outside the zone of physical 
danger, (2) return to the Dillon approach of amorphous guidelines, or 
(3) use a pure foreseeability approach that would probably allow recovery 
to both mothers?146 
We engage in a discussion of the reasons why courts have historically 
denied recovery to bystander plaintiffs—“the twin fears that courts will
be flooded with an onslaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable
claims.”147  The Dillon court carefully considered those reasons and, with 
the adoption of suggested guidelines to determine foreseeability, rejected
them.148 I remind the class that the oldest case in the Prosser torts
casebook is I de S et ux. v. W de S,149 decided in 1348—more than 660 
injury to their grandchildren, grandchildren can only recover for a negligent injury to their
grandparents if they reside in the same household.
146. In challenging the Thing requirements, I also discuss Holliday v. Jones, 264 
Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1989).  In that case, Mr. Holliday was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter for killing his wife.  Eventually the conviction was reversed because Mr. 
Holliday’s defense counsel was incompetent.  Represented by a different lawyer on retrial, 
Mr. Holliday was acquitted.  He sued his first attorney for legal malpractice and obtained 
a judgment of $1,100,000, which included $150,000 for the emotional distress suffered 
by his two minor children.  Id. at 449. In focusing on the question of whether the 
children should be permitted to recover for the emotional distress they had suffered, the 
California Court of Appeal began its analysis by stating: “Initially we wish to emphasize
the evidence in this case clearly establishes [that the lawyer’s] negligence caused the 
Holliday children to suffer emotional distress.”  Id. at 450.  The court then described in 
detail that distress, including these statements: “The children worried about how long 
they would be separated from their father and how and where they would live during this
period. They resided at seven different locations during their father’s incarceration. Their 
schoolmates asked them embarrassing questions and their schoolwork suffered dramatically.”
Id. The court concluded its analysis of this portion of the case by acknowledging: “The 
Holliday children are indeed sympathetic victims who have suffered as a foreseeable result of
[their father’s lawyer’s] negligence.” Id.  Nevertheless, relying upon the Thing
requirements for bystander recovery, the court held that “the Holliday children are not 
entitled to recover damages for the negligently inflicted emotional distress caused by
[their father’s lawyer’s] conduct.”  Id. at 453. I ask whether recovery should be denied to
plaintiffs who the appellate court acknowledges are sympathetic victims that the evidence
clearly establishes have suffered serious emotional distress as a foreseeable result of the
defendant’s negligence? 
147. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1968). 
148. Id. at 917–25. 
149. Y.B. Lib. Ass. fol. 99, placitum 60 (at the Assizes 1348), reprinted in SCHWARTZ ET
AL., supra note 54, at 37. 
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years ago. In I de S, the court ruled that emotional distress alone, even 
without any accompanying physical injury, is itself an injury for which
the law, through the tort of assault, will grant recovery to a plaintiff.150 
Today we know far more about this type of injury than was known in 
1348.  Should we deny recovery today for genuine claims of emotional 
distress because of our concern that a plaintiff’s injury cannot be precisely 
defined or might be fraudulently asserted?  For hundreds of years, we
have relied upon lawyers to present evidence to support and refute claims of
emotional distress and on jurors to weigh that evidence and make
appropriate decisions as to liability.  Even for purely physical injuries, 
jurors are routinely called upon to determine appropriate monetary 
awards for the pain and suffering of tort victims.  Pain and suffering are 
experienced through the mind of the victim.  If jurors are competent to 
determine the monetary worth of pain and suffering, why should jurors
be considered any less competent to determine emotional distress damages? 
In Thing, the California Supreme Court raised another policy consideration
to justify limiting liability to bystander plaintiffs.  The court asserted that 
the desirability of avoiding “limitless liability out of all proportion to the 
degree of a defendant’s negligence, and against which it is impossible to
insure without imposing unacceptable costs on those among whom the 
risk is spread” justifies “restrictions on recovery for emotional distress
notwithstanding the sometime arbitrary result.”151 I ask the class to 
consider whether the inability of a defendant to insure against the cost of 
an injury wrongfully inflicted on a plaintiff justifies an admittedly
arbitrary decision to deny tort recovery to that victim.  After all, if the
defendant had not engaged in the unreasonable behavior in the first 
place, the plaintiff would not have been injured.  Typically, the class
rejects the Thing court’s reasoning, even though the result may mean
that innocent policy owners may be charged higher premiums on their 
insurance policies.
Finally, I ask whether the costs of bystander plaintiff recovery and the 
possibility of fraudulent claims warrant at least some modification in the
way in which claims are processed, even if the Thing rules—considered
as a package of three requirements—are too restrictive.  If, for example, 
courts employ a foreseeability approach, should the bystander plaintiff
be required to prove damages by a higher standard than is usually employed? 
150. See id.
151. Thing, 771 P.2d at 826–27. 
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Instead of requiring proof of injury by a preponderance of the evidence, 
would students support a rule that requires proof by clear and convincing 
evidence, or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt? 
I also ask whether courts should focus on the injury requirement to
appropriately limit a defendant’s potential liability. In the Thing case,
the California Supreme Court required bystanders to prove that they had 
suffered serious emotional distress and further defined such distress as
“a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested
witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.”152 
That Thing requirement was not a revision of a Dillon guideline, but 
rather, was a new requirement that parallels the Restatement of Torts
requirement that the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress in order to 
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.153 
Negligence is a lower level of fault than intentional misconduct.  Therefore,
if a plaintiff is required to prove that he or she suffered severe emotional 
distress to recover for the intentional tort, then requiring a plaintiff to 
prove that he or she suffered serious emotional distress should not be 
objectionable for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
The students’ emotional reaction to the Thing facts surely influences
their judgment about the undesirability of adopting arbitrary requirements to
limit bystander recovery.  Nevertheless, I believe it is important to 
temper their emotional response with a rational discussion of reasonable
restrictions that could be placed on bystander recovery that would 
reassure courts that defendants are not exposed to excessive liability. 
E. Punitive Damages 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,154 the 
United States Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award of $145 
million in a case in which compensatory damages were only $1 million 
was excessive and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.155  Although the Court declined to impose a bright-line
152. Id. at 830 (citing and quoting from Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw.
1970)). In Rodrigues, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled: “[S]erious mental distress may
be found where a reasonable [person] normally constituted, would be unable to adequately
cope with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.”  Rodrigues, 
472 P.2d at 519. 
153. Comment j to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts limits recovery
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to situations in which the emotional
“distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. j (1965). 
154. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
155. Id. at 412, 429. 
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ratio that a punitive damage award cannot exceed,156 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court’s majority, declared: “[I]n practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, 
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”157 
I ask the class whether they agree with the Supreme Court’s decision 
to impose a single-digit ratio limitation on punitive damages.  I note that 
the lawsuit before the Court involved the tort of insurance bad faith.  The 
case did not involve a defendant who intentionally inflicted either a 
physical injury or death on a person, but rather, only an economic injury.
The jury found that the insurance company refused to pay a claim against
their insured in good faith. Although Justice Kennedy acknowledged “that
State Farm’s handling of the claims against the Campbells merits no
praise,” is conduct that inflicts only economic loss and not physical 
injury or death sufficiently reprehensible158 to warrant the award of 
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages?  Even if some
award of punitive damages is appropriate, is a single-digit ratio limitation 
on punitive damages appropriate to prevent excess punishment of a 
defendant in a civil lawsuit? 
As a part of our discussion, I ask the class to consider what possible
argument could have been made by the plaintiff’s attorney that would
convince the jury in the Campbell case to make a punitive damage award
of $145 million when compensatory damages were only $1 million.  As 
they are contemplating that question, I read a portion of Justice Ginsberg’s
dissent in the case—a dissent that was not reproduced in the casebook: 
The trial court . . . determined that the jury could find State Farm’s policy 
“deliberately crafted” to prey on consumers who would be unlikely to defend
themselves.  In this regard, the trial court noted the testimony of several former
State Farm employees affirming that they were trained to target “the weakest of
the herd”—“the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who are least 
knowledgeable about their rights and thus most vulnerable to trickery or deceit, 
156. Id. at 425. 
157. Id.
158. I specifically chose the word “reprehensible” in my question to the students.
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996), the Supreme Court
articulated three guidelines for courts to use in reviewing the reasonableness of punitive
damage awards. The first and “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”  In 
Campbell, the Court repeated its assertion that the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct is “the most important indicium of a punitive damages award’s reasonableness.” 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 409. 
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or who have little money and hence have no real alternative but to accept an
inadequate offer to settle a claim at much less than fair value.”
The Campbells themselves could be placed within the “weakest of the herd”
category.  The couple appeared economically vulnerable and emotionally fragile. At
the time of State Farm’s wrongful conduct, “Mr. Campbell had residuary effects
from a stroke and Parkinson’s disease.” 
To further insulate itself from liability, trial evidence indicated, State Farm
made “systematic” efforts to destroy internal company documents that might reveal
its scheme, efforts that directly affected the Campbells.  For example, State Farm
had “a special historical department that contained a copy of all past manuals on
claim-handling practices and the dates on which each section of each manual was
changed.”  Yet in discovery proceedings, State Farm failed to produce any claim-
handling practice manuals for the years relevant to the Campbells’ bad-faith case.159 
The students are outraged. How could the Court’s majority simply
characterize the defendant’s handling of the claim against the Campbells
as “merit[ing] no praise”?  People purchase an insurance policy in order 
to have peace of mind when a problem arises that is covered by that 
policy.  When a claim against an insured arises, the insured expects that 
the insurance company will pay that claim in good faith.  State Farm’s 
conduct in the Campbell case was egregious. It was sufficiently detestable
that an award of punitive damages in a significant amount was appropriate. 
But how do we go about determining what is an appropriate amount? 
In reaching its judgment that the jury’s punitive damage award in 
Campbell was excessive, the majority noted that the harm suffered by
plaintiffs “arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not from some
physical assault or trauma; there were no physical injuries.”160  Further, 
the majority asserted that much of the award of compensatory damages
was for the emotional damages caused by the outrage and humiliation 
that the Campbells had suffered because of the actions of their insurer. 
Thus, the compensatory damages “were based on a component which
was duplicated in the punitive award.”161 
I ask students whether they find the majority’s reasoning persuasive. 
Most students find State Farm’s conduct so repugnant that they are not 
persuaded. We then discuss arguments that could be made to support a 
larger award of punitive damages.  For example, was it appropriate for 
the Court to characterize emotional distress damages as both compensatory 
and punitive?  If so, then could the award of any noneconomic 
damage—such as pain and suffering—also be construed as punitive? 
Courts have not so construed them. Consider also that the award of
punitive damages as punishment differs from other punishment that can
159. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 433–34 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 426 (majority opinion). 
161. Id.
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be imposed in a criminal case. No one is being locked up, losing his or
her liberty.  All that is happening in this case is that a large corporation 
is being required to pay money for the wrongdoing of its employees.  If
the award of punitive damages is supposed to discourage abhorrent 
behavior by the defendant, will a formula that limits the maximum punitive
damage award to a single-digit multiplier of compensatory damages
assure society that the defendant will be adequately discouraged from
repeating the conduct? Will some defendants—especially large
corporations—be able to calculate possible punitive damage awards as an
acceptable cost of doing business, thus defeating the very purpose of
awarding punitive damages?  For example, in what has been denounced 
as “[t]he most infamous tort case,”162 a woman received a $2.9 million 
jury verdict, of which $2.7 million was for punitive damages, after she 
burned herself while trying to remove the cover of a cup of hot coffee 
purchased at McDonald’s.163  While most people know of that case and 
condemn the jury’s decision, few are aware of evidence, presented at trial, 
that supported the jury’s decision.  At the time, McDonald’s required its 
franchises to brew its coffee at 195 to 205 degrees and to serve it to 
customers at 180 to 190 degrees.164  By comparison, coffee made at
home is brewed at 130 to 140 degrees.165  The plaintiff, Stella Liebeck, 
was a seventy-nine-year-old woman at the time of the incident who 
suffered third-degree burns to her groin, inner thighs and buttocks.  She 
was hospitalized for seven days for a series of painful skin grafts.166  At
trial, McDonald’s asserted that the plaintiff contributed to her injury by 
not removing her clothing immediately after the coffee spilled. 
However, an expert for the plaintiff testified that it takes less than three 
seconds to produce a third-degree burn at 190 degrees, but about twenty
seconds if the coffee had been 160 degrees.167 
Additionally, in the ten-year period prior to this event, “McDonald’s
had received at least 700 reports of coffee burns ranging from mild to 
162. CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 19 (2001).
163. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 
360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 16777704 
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (unpublished order). 
164. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that a Coffee Spill Is 
Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1. 
165. BOGUS, supra note 162, at 19. 
166. Gerlin, supra note 164. 
167. Id.
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third degree, and had settled claims arising from scalding injuries for
more than $500,000.”168  Apparently, McDonald’s had made an economic
judgment that the potential cost of lawsuits for injuries caused by their 
superheated coffee did not outweigh the benefit of the profits that could 
be made by continuing to serve superheated coffee to customers.  
inform the students that McDonald’s sells a billion cups of coffee a 
year,169 and that the $2.7 million that the jury awarded as punitive damages
in this case was an amount equal to two days of McDonald’s coffee
sales. Having provided those additional facts, I ask students whether, in 
their judgment, the award was excessive.  Most agree that the award was 
not excessive.170 
F. Products Liability: Defining Defect 
In 1965, the American Law Institute published its final draft of section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. That landmark section 
declares that strict liability is imposed for physical harm caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer of a product that is sold “in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”171  Comment i to 
section 402A clarified the meaning of the words “unreasonably 
dangerous.” A product is not unreasonably dangerous—and therefore is 
not defective—simply because it cannot be made entirely safe for all 
consumption.  Sugar, for example, may be a deadly poison to diabetics 
but is not an unreasonably dangerous product.  Whiskey is not unreasonably 
dangerous merely because it makes some people drunk and is especially
dangerous to alcoholics.  Butter is not unreasonably dangerous simply
because it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks.172 
In discussing section 402A’s definition of “defect,” I challenge the 
limitations on strict liability suggested by comment i.  I ask the class to
consider two products—each of which generates strong emotional
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. In the case, the jury found that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and
assessed her fault at 20%.  Thus the plaintiff’s compensatory award was reduced to $160,000. 
Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 16777704 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (unpublished order).  On the defendant’s motion, the trial judge reduced
the jury’s punitive damage award to $480,000. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., 
Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 16777706 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (order on
defendant’s post-trial motion). Although McDonald’s appealed, the parties ultimately settled
for an undisclosed sum.  Liebeck, 1994 WL 16777704 (order on motion to vacate).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
172. Id. cmt. i. 
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reactions. The first is a Monster Thickburger®—which can be purchased
at Hardee’s fast food restaurant—a burger containing 1320 calories, 95 
grams of fat (including 36 grams of saturated fat), 210 milligrams of 
cholesterol, and 3020 milligrams of sodium.173  When this burger was
first marketed in November 2004, Hardee’s hailed it as “a monument to
decadence.”174 The executive director of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest declared the Monster Thickburger® to be “a heart attack
on a bun.”175  Because the dangers of this product are well known— 
increased risk of coronary heart disease, type 2 diabetes, and various
cancers—does this mean that it is not a defective product?  Should fast 
food makers be immunized from liability when they produce and sell 
such products because they are characterized as not unreasonably
dangerous?176 
The students are split on this issue.  Some strongly believe that liability is
completely inappropriate here.  People know that these burgers are high 
in calories and fat, but they should have the option of eating one if they
choose to do so. After all, this is supposedly a free country, and we 
should be able to make decisions that impact our own lives without 
anyone’s interference—even if others view our decisions as unwise or 
even harmful to ourselves.  Do we really want to return to a time 
of Prohibition, when people were not permitted to drink alcoholic 
beverages? What is next, prohibiting smoking or overeating—or even 
drinking coffee that others view as too hot for our own good?  Imposing
tort liability on producers of various products that are declared to be 
defective results in those products being taken off the market, 
diminishing our freedom of choice.  Let the market decide whether the 
173. Hardee’s, Hardee’s Menu, http://www.hardees.com/menu/ (last visited Apr. 5, 
2010) (nutrition information for 2/3 lb. Monster Thickburger®).
174. Kevin Tibbles, Hardee’s Unveils the Biggest Burger Ever, MSNBC, Nov. 16, 
2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6505575/.
175. Id.
176. Hardee’s is not alone in selling burgers that are high in calories and fat.  Ruby
Tuesday’s, for example, created an Ultimate Colossal Burger that outdoes Hardee’s Monster
Thickburger®. The Ultimate Colossal Burger contains 1677 calories, including 1026
calories from fat.  The total grams of fat in this burger is 114.0, which is 175% of the fat 
that an adult on a 2000-calorie diet should ingest in a day.  Calories in Ruby Tuesday
Colossal Burger, http://caloriecount.about.com/calories-ruby-tuesday-colossalburger-i54870 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2010). MSNBC reported an even higher calorie and fat count for the 
Ultimate Colossal Burger: 1940 calories and 141 grams of fat.  Allison Linn, On Some Menus,
One Plate Packs 2,000 Calories, MSNBC, Mar. 5, 2007, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/17349197/. 
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product should be sold,177 not some overweight consumer who, having
chosen to eat a Monster Thickburger®—or many of them—now seeks to
blame the restaurant for his or her excessive bulk and deny others the 
choice that he or she had to consume a burger. 
Other students are equally appalled that Monster Thickburgers® and 
other such products are served today.  Obesity is a national epidemic. 
Between 1980 and 2004, the prevalence of obesity in the United States 
doubled among adults.178  The National Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention reports that more than one-third of American adults—over 72
million people—are obese.179  Obesity, and the health problems associated
with obesity, is no laughing matter.  Why should Hardee’s be able to
poison a person with its “monument to decadence” simply because that
individual was willing to pay $5.49 to receive it?  If a father or a mother 
dies from a heart attack, or contracts cancer or diabetes, caused in part
by ingestion of those burgers, the whole family—not just the individual—is 
adversely impacted.  Consider also the marketing practices of fast food
restaurants. Who do they target as their victims?  It is not just adults
who seek a quickly prepared meal.  It is also children and teenagers who 
are the objective of their marketing practices.180  If parents are unwilling 
or unable to protect their children from the dangers of these products, 
shouldn’t the tort system be available to do that job? 
The second product I discuss is a .50 caliber rifle, which was described 
on a CBS 60 Minutes news segment as
the Rolls Royce of sniper rifles. It’s a big gun, a favorite of armies around the 
world, and it’s still available in 49 states in this country to anyone over 18 with
a clean record.
It is, without a doubt, the most powerful weapon you can buy. . . .  [I]t’s 
powerful enough to kill a man or pierce armor from more than a mile away.
177. Why do you suppose McDonald’s was able to sell one billion cups of superheated
coffee a year?  That is the way customers wanted their coffee served.  Why do you suppose 
the Liebeck case was widely condemned in the popular press?  Because McDonald’s 
customers wanted to continue to have their coffee served superhot.
178. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OBESITY
AMONG ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES—NO STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 
2003–2004, at 1–2 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db01.pdf. 
179. Id. The National Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also reports that
two-thirds—yes, two-thirds—of American adults are overweight or obese.  See Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight: FastStats, http://www.
cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
180. See Michael S. Rosenwald, McDonald’s Tries To Get Moms on Its Side, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 28, 2008, at A20 (describing McDonald’s program to improve 
its image by recruiting mothers as Quality Correspondents to convince customers of the 
nutritional value of its products). 
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A Senate report said that a bullet from a .50-caliber rifle, even at 1.5 miles,
crashes into a target with more energy than a bullet fired at point-blank range
from Dirty Harry’s famous .44 Magnum.181 
Although the .50 caliber rifle is a military-grade weapon and is used by 
the armed forces of thirty-five countries, it is also available to private 
citizens for target shooting and big game hunting.182  Is the .50 caliber 
rifle a defective product because of the danger it poses to a potential
victim located a mile-and-a-half away from the person firing the rifle?183 
Is the .50 caliber rifle a defective product because it could be purchased
and used by a terrorist?
Again, the class divides on this issue.  Some, citing the Second Amendment 
and our constitutional right to bear arms, believe that legitimate use of 
this rifle should not be precluded.  After all, the real problem is not the 
rifle itself, but rather, misuse of the rifle by the person firing the rifle.  If 
tort liability is to be imposed, it should be imposed on the user who
causes the injury, not on the manufacturer or seller of the rifle. The 
product is not defective simply because it is powerful and can strike a 
target a mile-and-a-half away. 
Others question whether a rifle this powerful should be available to 
civilians. Isn’t the danger that it could be purchased and used by a 
terrorist so great that prohibition of sale to civilians is justified? Does 
the enjoyment of target shooting and killing big game by users of the 
product—the benefit of the product—really outweigh the danger 
inherent in the weapon itself if it should fall into the wrong person’s 
181. Rebecca Leung, Big Rifle a Terrorist Tool?, CBS NEWS, Jan. 9, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/06/60minutes/main665257.shtml. In 2004, California 
enacted legislation that banned the sale of .50 caliber rifles to civilians. .50 Caliber BMG 
Regulation Act of 2004, ch. 494, 2004 Cal. Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CAL. PENAL CODE (2005)).  See People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 577 
(Ct. App. 2009) (holding that possession of an assault weapon in California—including a 
.50 caliber rifle—is not protected by the Second Amendment as construed by the United 
States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)).  The 
James court cited numerous examples discussed by the California Supreme Court in 
Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 586–89 (Cal. 2000), describing why such rifles are 
unusually dangerous weapons. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 581–82. 
182. Leung, supra note 181. 
183. Although section 402A specifically imposes strict liability on sellers of 
defective products that cause injury to users or consumers of the product, comment o to
section 402A declares that “[t]here may be no essential reason why [non-users and non-
consumers] should not be brought within the scope of the protection afforded . . . . The 
Institute expresses neither approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit 
recovery by such persons.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. o (1965). 
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hands—the risk of the product? If our constitutional right to bear arms 
permits us to possess a .50 caliber rifle, does it also permit us to possess
hand grenades, or even weapons of mass destruction? 
The use of the Monster Thickburger® and the .50 caliber rifle examples
set the stage for a discussion of the changes to the product liability
provisions contained in the Third Restatement of Torts, published in
1998, thirty-three years after the Second Restatement of Torts was 
published. The most fundamental change was to abandon a single
definition for all product defects and to replace it with separate 
definitions for manufacturing defects, defects in design, and defects in 
warnings.184  A product is defective in design “when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.”185  The Third 
Restatement reporters acknowledge that in assessing whether a product’s 
design is defective, “the viewpoint of a reasonable person” is used to 
compare the product’s design with an alternative design.186  In essence, 
the Third Restatement returned to a negligence basis of liability for 
design defect cases.187  Should the plaintiff be confronted with the onerous
burden of proving fault—negligence—by the defendant in the choice of 
the product’s design?  Or should the plaintiff be able to succeed on a no 
fault basis—strict liability imposed if plaintiff merely proves that the 
product was defectively designed and that plaintiff was injured by the 
product?  Does the language of the Second Restatement, which requires 
that the defective condition of the product be “unreasonably dangerous,” 
retain a negligence character for the supposedly strict liability cause of 
action?188  Does the language of the Third Restatement, which requires
184. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 54, at 739. 
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
186. Id. cmt. d. 
187. In referring to design defect cases, the Third Restatement reporters declare: “The
policy reasons that support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with the 
general negligence standard also support its use in the products liability context.”  Id.
 188. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972), the California 
Supreme Court criticized the use of the term “unreasonably dangerous” in the section 
402A definition of a defective product, asserting that the language fails to purge the 
phrase “defective condition” of its negligence complexion.  “We think that a requirement 
that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product ‘unreasonably dangerous’ 
places upon him a significantly increased burden and represents a step backward in the 
area pioneered by this court.” Id.  The court noted that “the very purpose of our pioneering
efforts in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing
negligence . . . and thereby ‘to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective 
products are borne by the manufacturers.’”  Id. (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)). 
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the plaintiff to prove that the product could have been made safer “by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design” and that “the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe,” really 
impose a new and more difficult burden on the plaintiff than the burden 
imposed under the Second Restatement? 
I note that although the Third Restatement reestablishes negligence as
the basis of liability for design defect cases, there is language in the 
comments to the section that assists the plaintiff in proving defect.  For 
example, comment d does not preclude a finding of defect even if the 
dangers of the product were open and obvious, provided the plaintiff is
able to establish “that a reasonable alternative design should have been
adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to the plaintiff.”189 
Also, although comment d requires the plaintiff to prove a reasonable 
alternative design “even though the plaintiff alleges that the category of
product sold by the defendant is so dangerous that it should not have 
been marketed at all,”190 nevertheless, the Third Restatement reporters 
acknowledge: “Several courts have suggested that the designs of some
products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low social 
utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach even absent 
proof of a reasonable alternative design.”191  In discussing those court 
decisions, the reporters use the example of a toy gun that shoots hard
rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to injure children.  Toy guns that 
are unlikely to cause injury—such as guns that shoot ping-pong balls, 
soft gelatin pellets, or water—are reasonable alternatives to the hard
pellet gun.  Even if the realism of the hard pellet gun, and thus its capacity
to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who purchase and use 
such products to reject those alternatives, the court could impose liability 
without proof of a reasonable alternative design.  The hard pellet toy gun
is “defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree
of danger posed by its use . . . so substantially outweighs its negligible 
social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the 
relevant facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the
product.”192  If the capacity to cause injury can be characterized as an 
189. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. cmt. e. 
192. Id. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d.
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“egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use by children,”193 is the
capacity of a .50 caliber rifle to cause injury to a person located a mile-
and-a-half away from the shooter an equally egregiously unacceptable 
quality in a rifle—or should I say “toy”—for use by adults? 
The two examples also enable the class to consider whether tort law— 
civil litigation by injured parties seeking compensation for injuries—is 
the best way, or even an appropriate way, to resolve problems of this
nature. Is legislation, either at the state or federal level, more appropriate? 
For example, in 2004 and 2005, the House of Representatives considered
and voted favorably on a bill entitled the Personal Responsibility in 
Food Consumption Act—also known as the Cheeseburger Bill—but the 
Senate did not act on the bill.194  The purpose of the bill was to immunize
producers and retailers of foods from lawsuits brought by obese
customers.195  The bill was reintroduced in 2009 with a new title, the
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009.196  In contrast, in 2005, Congress 
passed, and the President signed, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, prohibiting tort actions against manufacturers, distributors,
dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition for harm caused by the
criminal or unlawful misuse of firearms or ammunition.197  The bill was 
described as the number one legislative priority of the National Rifle
Association (NRA).198  Apparently, the NRA is a stronger and more 
effective lobbyist than fast food industry lobbyists. 
III. CONCLUSION
I used to get mad at my school,
the teachers who taught me weren’t cool.
You’re holding me down,
turning me ‘round,
filling me up with your rules.199 
193. Id.
 194. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2004);
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005). 
195. See Library of Congress, Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR00554:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2010).
196. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2009). 
197. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006). 
198. Sheryl Gay Stobberg, Congress Passes New Legal Shield for Gun Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/21/politics/
21guns.html?_r=2. 
199. THE BEATLES, Getting Better, on SGT. PEPPER’S LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND
(Capitol Records 2009) (1967). 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Through the case method and Socratic dialogue, first-year law students
learn to develop critical legal analytical skills—to “think like lawyers.” 
Those skills are primarily, if not entirely, intellectual.  Although the
development of analytical skills is crucial to our students’ legal education, it
should not exclude all other objectives of our teaching.  If that is all law
professors do, then we are not being cool.  We are doing little more than 
filling up our students’ minds with our rules.  Because emotion impacts 
thinking and learning, we need to adapt our teaching to include an
emotional component.  We should not fear emotion, banishing it from the 
classroom.  Appropriately used, the “emotion” component of our instruction 
will not jeopardize the development of analytical skills; it will supplement,
but not supplant, that development. 
In this Article, I have urged professors teaching first-year law courses 
to use examples in their classes that generate an emotional response by
students. To encourage them to do so, I have provided examples that I 
have used in my Torts class.  When students experience emotion in the 
classroom, the issue under discussion is internalized.  Students are more
invested in the discourse.  But stimulation of student interest in class
discussion is only one benefit.  For many students, the use of emotional 
examples is a reminder of the idealistic goals they had when they chose 
to attend law school and to become lawyers.  In a Torts course, for 
example, when students experience anger or disgust at a person who has 
wrongfully hurt another, or when students experience sympathy for the 
victim of wrongdoing, they also consider the role of attorneys in
representing clients in trying to right the wrong—in trying to achieve 
justice for their client. They believe that, as lawyers, they will be able to 
use the law to help others and to improve society.  Their idealism is
renewed. They are receptive to learning the skills necessary for them to 
become lawyers and to practice law as competent and ethical attorneys. 
What more can we hope to achieve as teachers?
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